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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
ExxonMobil Corporation and Mobil Exploration and Producing are unaware of
parties other than those identified in the caption of this Opening Brief of Petitioners.
1.

The Petitioner, ExxonMobil Corporation, shall be referred to herein as
"ExxonMobil." The official name for Petitioner, Mobil Exploration and
Producing, is Mobil Exploration and Producing North America, Inc., and
shall be referred to herein as "MEPNA." ExxonMobil and MEPNA shall
be referred to collectively as "Petitioners."

2.

The Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, shall be referred to herein as
the "Commission."
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from the Order Denying Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment
(the "Order") of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") issued on
November 17, 2008 and attached hereto as Addendum 1. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(ii).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

This appeal can be entirely resolved by addressing the following issue:
Did the Commission err when it held that ExxonMobil and its wholly-owned

subsidiary, MEPNA, were not entitled to retroactive application of the ExxonMobil
decision despite the ExxonMobil Court's declaration that the prospective effect limitation
applied "to all but ExxonMobil"? ExxonMobil Corp, v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2003
UT 53 123, 86 P.3d 706, 712. R. 12. A complete copy of the ExxonMobil decision is
contained in Addendum 2 and will be cited hereafter as "ExxonMobil, % .".
Standard of review: "Interpreting case law presents a question of law. . . .
Accordingly, we review the district court's interpretation of our ruling . . . for
correctness." Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2005 UT 63, % 32, 125 P.3d 860.
B.

If the Court upholds the Commission's interpretation of ExxonMobil, then,
and only then, would the Court need to address these remaining issues:
1.

Was the prospective effect doctrine properly invoked by the ExxonMobil

Court even though the ExxonMobil decision did not announce a new rule of law but
merely clarified the meaning of existing law?
1

Standard of review: "Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we
may overrule it where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as
to render the prior decision inapplicable.'" Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ^f 20,
173 P.3d 848, quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n. 3 (Utah 1994).
2.

Should the ExxonMobil Court reverse its prospective effect limitation

inasmuch as the policy considerations upon which the Court relied were based on factual
errors regarding the potential fiscal impact of the retroactive application of ExxonMobil!
Standard of review: "Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we
may overrule it where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as
to render the prior decision inapplicable.'" Id.
3.

Did the ExxonMobil Court exceed its constitutional authority and usurp the

legislative function when it deprived taxpayers other than ExxonMobil of the right to rely
on the Court's correct interpretation of severance tax laws thereby ensuring that the
Commission would continue to enforce it misinterpretation of such laws despite the
Court's finding that "[t]he Tax Commission's position regarding the statutory meaning is
incorrect"? ExxonMobil, ^ 20.
Standard of review: "Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we
may overrule it where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as
to render the prior decision inapplicable.'" Munson, 2007 UT 91, f 20.

2

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The primary issue in this matter will be determined by this Court's interpretation
of its own prior decision in ExxonMobil Corp, v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2003 UT 53,
86 P.3d 706. The specific language from that case, which Petitioners believe the
Commission erroneously interpreted, is as follows:
We recognize, however, that preventing the retroactive application of the
rule to ExxonMobil, which has expended considerable time and resources
to attack the actions of the Tax Commission, would both deprive
ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory and 'potentially]. . . discourage[e]
other litigants from challenging [actions] of questionable validity.'
Id., TI 23 (citations omitted).
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application
only.
Id., Tf 23 (emphasis added).
Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our
holding is to apply prospectively only.
Id., \ 24 (emphasis added).
The issues presented in the alternative do not depend on this Court's interpretation
of Constitutional, statutory, or administrative law.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of an administrative proceeding before the Commission

concerning statutory notices issued to ExxonMobil and MEPNA by the Auditing Division
of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Division") which denied the Petitioners' requests
for severance tax refunds.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On November 25, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court issued the ExxonMobil decision

in which it provided an interpretation of portions of Utah statutory provisions on
severance tax. The ExxonMobil Court held that "as to all but ExxonMobil the rule
announced today is to have prospective application only." ExxonMobil, % 23.
After the ExxonMobil decision was issued, MEPNA filed amended severance tax
returns for tax years 1999 and 2000 and ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns
for 1998 through 2003. The Division granted MEPNA's refund request for 1999 and
denied all remaining refund requests insofar as those requests were based on deductions
of transportation costs as permitted under the ExxonMobil decision. Appeal No. 06-0915
R. 1; Appeal No. 06-1218 R. 193; Appeal No. 07-1118 R. 177; Appeal No. 07-1124
R. 176.1
because these appeals were informally consolidated for purposes of discovery and
Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment, substantially identical pleadings are
contained in the record for each of the four appeals. In the interest of clarity and brevity,
Petitioners5 citations to the record will be to those documents contained in Appeal No.
4

ExxonMobil and MEPNA filed timely appeals from the statutory notices denying
Petitioners' refund requests. Id. On February 26, 2008, Petitioners filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment by which they claimed that the ExxonMobil decision should be
retroactively applied to their refund requests. R. 71. A hearing on the Motion was held
on June 17, 2008. R. 510. On November 17, 2008, the Commission issued its Order
Denying Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 509.2 Petitioners filed their
Petition for Review on December 10, 2008. R. 533.
C.

Commission's Disposition of the Administrative Proceeding
In its Order the Commission found that there were no factual disputes which

precluded summary judgment, R. 515-516, and held "that ExxonMobil is not entitled to
the retroactive application of the Court's decision in ExxonMobil Corporation to the
refund requests at issue in these appeals that are now before the Commission." R, 520.
The Commission's denial of Petitioner's motion was based on its decision to
narrowly interpret the ExxonMobil Court's decision to grant limited retroactive relief.
The Commission held that, notwithstanding the Court's refusal to "prevent[] the
retroactive application of the rule to ExxonMobil," the ExxonMobil Court's "policy
considerations [were] best met by interpreting the Court's retroactive application

06-0915, except where it is necessary to cite to pleadings or documents that are unique to
one of the four appeals in which case the appeal number will be identified with the
appropriate record cite.
2

The Order of the Commission will be referred to herein as the "Order" and is
found at Addendum 1, and comprises R. 509 through 526.
5

narrowly to only include the 'refund request' that was before the court in ExxonMobil
Corporation." R. 518.
Although the Commission acknowledged that "the Court's statement that 'as to all
but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only'. ..
could, in isolation, be interpreted to allow other claims by ExxonMobil," the Commission
held that the Court's granting of limited retroactive relief was "limited to the specific
claim for a refund before the Court during that proceeding," R. 519.
Commissioner Dixon dissented from the Commission's Order concluding that
Petitioners were entitled to retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision. She
observed:
The Court could have specifically limited ExxonMobil to the years before it
as it did in Rio Algom. The Court did not; thus, there is nothing in the
ExxonMobil decision to indicate relief for the Petitioner is limited to the
years that were before the Court.
R. 522.
Because the only issue raised by Petitioners' Requests for Agency Action was the
retroactive application of ExxonMobil to their refund requests, the Commission's decision
fully resolved the Petitioners' appeals. R. 515-516; 520.
ExxonMobil and MEPNA filed their Petition for Review on December 10, 2008.
R. 533.

6

D.

Statement of Relevant Facts
1.

ExxonMobil was formed on November 30, 1999 as a result of a merger

between Mobil Corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exxon Corporation. Order,
p. 3 (R. 511) at HI.
2.

Prior to the merger, MEPNA was a wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil

Corporation. As a result of the merger, MEPNA became a second-tier, wholly-owned
subsidiary of ExxonMobil. Id. at^|2.
3.

MEPNA still exists today as a separate legal entity. Id. at \ 3.

4.

During the 1990fs MEPNA owned and operated oil and gas producing wells

within the Greater Aneth Field in Southern Utah. Those wells were located in the
McElmo Creek Unit and the Ratherford Unit. Id. at ^ 4.
5.

Prior to the merger, MEPNA owned 39.956% of the production from the

McElmo Creek Unit. Exxon Corporation owned 24.787% and the remainder of the
production was owned by Texaco and The Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id. at ^f 5.
6.

Prior to the merger, MEPNA owned 64.367% of the production from the

Ratherford Unit. Exxon Corporation did not own any production from that field. Id. at

16.
7.

From 1993 through 1998, MEPNA filed returns and paid severance taxes on

its production of oil and gas from the Greater Aneth Field by calculating the value of oil
on the price that was paid at the point of sale. Order, pp. 3-4 (R. 511) at ^ 17.

7

8.

In 1999, after the merger, ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns,

amending the original returns filed by MEPNA for the 1993 through 1998 tax years. The
amended severance tax returns were based on the value of the oil produced using the netback method, which resulted in lower tax amounts than MEPNA had claimed on the
original severance tax returns for each of the years. Order, p. 4 (R. 512) at Tf 8.
9.

After the Division denied ExxonMobil's requests for refunds for the 1993

through 1998 tax years, ExxonMobil appealed to the Commission. The Commission
upheld the Division's denial of the requests for refunds. Id, at ^j 9-10.
10.

ExxonMobil appealed the Commission's decision to the Utah Supreme

Court. Id atf 11.
1L

Because MEPNA was a wholly owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil, all

litigation surrounding the refund requests was managed and financed by ExxonMobil. Id.
atTf 12.
12.

On November 25, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in that

appeal, providing an interpretation of portions of the severance tax provisions. Order,
p. 4 (R. 512) at 1| 13.
13.

The Court declined to give full retroactive effect to its interpretation in light

of revenue concerns raised by the Commission and certain amici. ExxonMobil, ^ 23.
However, the Court stated that "whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as

8

to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only."
Id. (emphasis added).
14.

The ExxonMobil Court remanded the matter to the Commission to calculate

severance taxes in accordance with the interpretation provided by the Court, and, on
November 21, 2005, the Commission directed the Division to issue a severance tax
refund to ExxonMobil in the amount of $2,168,334.87 plus statutory interest. Order,
pp. 4-5 (R. 512-513) at 1ffl 13-14.
15.

After the Commission determined that ExxonMobil was entitled to a re fund

for MEPNA's overpayment of severance taxes for tax years 1993 through 1998, MEPNA
filed amended severance tax returns for tax years 1999 and 2000, Order, p. 6 (R. 514) at
fflf 20 and 22, and ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns for 1998 through
2003. Order, p. 5 (R. 513) atfflf17-18, R. 514 at % 24, R. 515 at If 26.
16.

ExxonMobil's amended returns for 1998 and 1999 included deductions of

transportation costs to which Petitioners believed they were entitled under the
ExxonMobil decision in addition to corrected calculations based on oil stripper
exemptions, workover and recompletion credits. Order, p. 5 (R. 513) at ^| 17.
17.

All corrections made by ExxonMobil in its amended returns for 2000 to

2003 and by MEPNA in its amended returns for 1999 and 2000 were fully attributable to
deductions of transportation costs to which Petitioners believed they were entitled under
the ExxonMobil decision. Order, p. 6 (R. 514) at ^ 20, R. 515 at lj 26; Appeal No. 07-

9

1124 (ExxonMobil), R. 188 and R. 180 at If 12 - R. 181 at 1f 17; Appeal No. 07-1118
(Mobil), R. 186 and R. 179 at ^ 8 - R. 180 at ^ 14.
18.

The Division approved the portions of ExxonMobil's 1998 and 1999 refund

requests which were based on oil stripper exemptions and workover and recompletion
credits. The adjustments based on deductions of transportation costs were denied.
Appeal No. 06-0915 (ExxonMobil 1998) R. 10; Appeal No. 06-1218 (ExxonMobil 1999)
R. 202.
19.

The Division granted MEPNA's 1999 refund request for the entire alleged

overpayment amount of $285,842, plus applicable interest. That refund claim was fully
attributable to deductions of transportation costs to which MEPNA believed it was
entitled under ExxonMobil Order, p. 6 (R. 514) atfflf17-18.
20.

The Division denied MEPNA's refund request for 2000, R. 514 at f 22, and

ExxonMobil's refund requests for 2000 through 2003. Order, pp. 6-7 (R. 514-515) at
ffif 24 and 27.
21.

ExxonMobil and MEPNA filed timely appeals from those denials whereby

they asked the Commission to rule that Petitioners were entitled to retroactive application
of the ExxonMobil decision and thus entitled to all remaining refund requests under the
correct interpretation of severance tax laws. Id.
22.

The Commission denied Petitioners' refund requests, stating that

"ExxonMobil is not entitled to the retroactive application of the Court's decision in

10

ExxonMobil Corporation to the refund requests at issue in these appeals that are now
before the Commission." Order, p. 12 (R. 520).
SUMMARY
The Commission's legal interpretation of the ExxonMobil decision is reversible
error because it disregarded the plain language by which the Court conclusively
established the limitations on the application of the ExxonMobil decision. The
Commission also ignored well-established principles of interpreting tax law in favor of
the taxpayer when it narrowed the scope of retroactive application in furtherance of
questionable "policy considerations."
If this Court concludes that the Commission correctly interpreted the prospective
relief limitation when it denied the Petitioners' refund requests, then Petitioners would
urge this Court to reverse its decision to give only prospective application to its statutory
interpretation in ExxonMobil Under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107
(1971), a prospective effect limitation is only appropriate when the decision which will
not be applied retroactively has established "a new principle of law." The ExxonMobil
decision did not establish "a new principle of law" because the interpretation of a statute
merely "states the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Malan
v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). The prospective effect limitation is also
reversible error inasmuch as the revenue concerns cited by the Court in support of its
decision have proven to be unfounded. Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91. The

11

ExxonMobil Court's decision to give only prospective effect to a matter of statutory
interpretation created precedent with unforeseen ramifications based on a last minute
argument about an issue which "did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded
issues actually litigated in the lower courts." Id., ^f 21. The suggestion that a court's
correction of an agency's misinterpretation of a statute creates "new law" which cannot
be retroactively applied deprives taxpayers of their statutory right to obtain refunds to
which they would be entitled under the correct interpretation of the statute.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THIS COURT'S
PLAIN LANGUAGE WHICH PERMITTED RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF THE EXXONMOBIL DECISION TO EXXONMOBIL.
The scope of a limitation on the application of a court's decision is established by

the plain language used by the court imposing that limitation. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm % 862 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1993); see also In re Twin Parks Ltd.
Partnership, 720 F.2d 1374, 1376 (4th Cir. 1983)(uUltimately, the prospective or
retroactive effects of a new rule depend upon the enunciating court's intention."). When
this Court issued the ExxonMobil decision, interpreting Utah law to require valuation of
oil and gas "in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a
relatively natural state," ExxonMobil, \ 24, it gave limited retroactive effect to its
decision, stating:

12

Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application
only.
ExxonMobil, ^ 23 (emphasis added). In its review of that decision, the Commission
claims that the only retroactive relief approved by the Court was for the refund request at
issue in that appeal 3
There are several options available to a court when circumstances permit a court to
impose a limitation on the application of its decision.4 Those options include:
(1) complete retroactivity; (2) limited retroactivity "to all parties on direct appeal";
(3) application "only to the case in which the new principle is announced and to those
cases initiated in the future"; or (4) pure prospectivity. In re Twin Parks Ltd Partnership,
720 F.2d at 1376. A court may also give "retroactive effect as to . . . others who have
litigation pending." Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 196 (Utah
1984).
Neither the Commission nor the Petitioners have suggested that the language used
by the ExxonMobil Court supports a finding of "complete retroactivity" or "pure
prospectivity." Thus, the issue in this appeal is whether the language used by the
3

The ExxonMobil appeal began as six separate refund requests for 1993 through
1998. Those individual appeals were ultimately consolidated into a single proceeding.
Order,ffif9-10 (R. 512).
Petitioners believe that the prospective relief limitation announced in ExxonMobil
was reversible error because the decision did not announce a new rule of law, but simply
provided the correct interpretation of a statute. That position is discussed below in
Section II.
13

ExxonMobil Court granted "limited retroactivity to all parties on direct appeal," as argued
by Petitioners, or "only to the case in which the new principle is announced and to those
cases initiated in the future," as the Commission contends. Id. If the Court granted
"limited retroactivity to all parties on direct appeal," then the Court's interpretation of the
valuation statute should be applied retroactively for all claims by ExxonMobil and its
wholly-owned subsidiaries so long as those claims are not barred by the statute of
limitations.
A.

The Plain Language Used By The ExxonMobil Court Supports The
Conclusion That The Decision Is To Be Retroactively Applied To
Petitioners9 Refund Requests.

The plain language used by the ExxonMobil Court to define the scope of
retroactivity is the best indicator of whether the Court intended to give ExxonMobil the
benefit of the retroactive application of its decision. Kennecott, 862 P.2d at 1350.
Although the ExxonMobil Court was persuaded b> amici parties to restrict the application
of its decision, the Court specifically held that the prospective effect limitation would not
apply to ExxonMobil:
[Preventing the retroactive application of the rule to ExxonMobil, which
has expended considerable time and resources to attack the actions of the
Tax Commission, would both deprive ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory
and 'potential[ly] . .. discouragefe] other litigants from challenging
[actions] of questionable validity.'
ExxonMobil, ^f 23. In defining the extent to which ExxonMobil was entitled to the
retroactive application of the decision announced by the Court, the ExxonMobil Court did
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not use any language which would suggest that its declaration of retroactivity for
ExxonMobil was limited to only the matter under review:
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application
only.
Id (emphasis added). Finally, at the close of the decision, the Court once again explained
that the parties which would not receive the benefit of the retroactive application of the
ExxonMobil decision, were parties "other" than ExxonMobil.
Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our
holding is to apply prospectively only.
ExxonMobil, % 24 (emphasis added).5
5

This interpretation of the plain language of the provisions governing retroactive
application to ExxonMobil is consistent with how the Division initially interpreted the
limitations on retroactivity. Inge-Lise Goss, the tax manager identified by the Division as
its primary witness, explained that the Division approved MEPNA's 1999 refund request
because it believed that additional refund actions were authorized under ExxonMobil:
Q:

And for those that you did allow [a refund] to, which was the
MEPNA entity - You understand when I say "MEPNA" it's the
acronym for Mobil Exploration and Producing?

A:

Um-hum.

Q:

For MEPNA you did allow it for the 1999 year because you viewed
that they were the entity that the Supreme Court said should get
retroactive relief

A:

Yes, they were that same entity, and it was the methodology that the
Commissioners had determined.
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In Kennecott, the taxpayer claimed that the Rio Algom Court had not reached the
issue of whether litigants with pending claims could benefit from the Court's ruling. The
Court denied the taxpayer's request for retroactive application of its decision in Rio
Algom because "the opinion's plain language dictates that it apply only to those litigants
and only for 1981, the tax year for which the suit in Rio Algom was brought." Kennecott
Corp., 862 P.2d at 1350 (emphasis added). The Court observed that the Rio Algom Court
had discussed alternative approaches to the prospective effect limitation, stating:
[S]ome decisions that give only prospective effect to a holding of
unconstitutionality as to all other parties, give the holding retroactive effect
as to the litigants or others who have litigation pending.
Id quoting Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196. The Kennecott Court held that the foregoing
language showed that the Court was "cognizant of the various available options for
applying [its] holding in Rio Algom and specifically rejected its application to 'others who
[had] litigation pending.'" Id.
The Commission, in ruling that the ExxonMobil Court did not intend to permit
additional refund actions by Petitioners, ignored the fact that this Court was aware of its
available options when it decided to permit limited retroactive relief This fact is
evidenced by the Rio Algom Court's reference to multiple cases in which the plaintiffs
were not bound by the prospective relief limitations even in cases which had not yet been
filed. Stricklandv. Newton County, 244 Ga. 54, 258 S.E.2d 132 (1979)(plaintiffcounties

R. 223 at p. 88:6-16.
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"entitled to the fruits of the holding"); Kansas City Millwright Co. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658,
562 P.2d 65 (1977)(retroactive relief for parties, taxpayers who paid taxes under protest,
and taxpayers with pending litigation); and Perkins v. County of Albemarle, 214 Va. 416,
419, 200 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1973)(class of taxpayers entitled to retroactive application of
decision).
In Perkins the petitioning taxpayers had prevailed in their class action against
Albemarle County requesting declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of the
county's assessment methodology. On petition for rehearing, the court stated that it had
given prospective effect to its decision except as to "taxpayers upon whom Albemarle
County levied such unlawful taxes, including the plaintiffs and intervenors." Id As for
those taxpayers, the court stated that they "could pursue their remedies as the statutes
provide." Id It is clear from this statement that the parties excluded from the prospective
relief limitation were being permitted to file future proceedings to obtain refunds of
unlawfully collected taxes. The ExxonMobil Court's awareness of this available option
supports ExxonMobil's interpretation of the prospective relief limitation.
Subsequent to Rio Algom, the Utah Supreme Court held a taxing statute
unconstitutional, but gave retroactive application to the plaintiff "to the year in which V-1
alleges it began to pay the surcharge, subject only to any applicable statutes of limitations
and to the extent that V-1 can demonstrate that it paid the surcharge on motor fuels." V-1
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Oil Co, v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 942 P.2d 906, 915 (Utah 1996)6, vacated by V-l Oil
Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1997).7 The Court's decision to
permit retroactive relief for all years not barred by the statute of limitations once again
demonstrates the ExxonMobil Court's awareness of its various available options,
including the option to give full retroactive effect to the plaintiff in the case before it.
Because the plain language used by the Court authorizes complete retroactive application
for ExxonMobil, it was not appropriate for the Commission to infer limitations which
were not expressed by the Court.
L

There is no language in the ExxonMobil decision which limits the
application of the case to only the matter before the ExxonMobil
Court

The Commission conceded that "the Court's statement that 'as to all but
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only' could, in

6

The Commission relied on V-l to support its denial of the relief requested by
ExxonMobil, suggesting that the specificity with which the V-l Oil Court defined the
scope of relief available to V-l meant that the ExxonMobil Court needed to be equally
specific by stating that the retroactive relief was meant to extend to all years not barred by
applicable limitations periods, otherwise such relief was not available. Order, pp. 11-12.
The Commission erred when it inferred such a requirement, particularly inasmuch as the
Court very specifically declared, without limitation, that "as to all but ExxonMobil the
rule announced today is to have prospective application only." ExxonMobil, ^J 23.
7

The Court vacated the prior judgment because, on rehearing, it determined that the
statute it had held unconstitutional did not impose a tax, but a fee and therefore was not
subject to the same scrutiny which is applicable to a taxing statute. Although the Court's
decision was reversed, it is nonetheless instructive to consider how the Court fashioned
the prospective relief limitation in connection with its determination that the statute was
unconstitutional.
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isolation, be interpreted to allow other claims by ExxonMobil"

Order, p. 11 (R. 519)

(emphasis added). Despite its acknowledgment that the ExxonMobil decision permits
such an interpretation, the Commission inexplicably concluded that "it is clear [that]. . .
the retroactive application granted was limited to the specific claim for refund before the
Court during that proceeding." Order, p. 10 (R. 518). The Commission's conclusion that
the language permitting additional claims should be disregarded is based entirely on the
following statement by the ExxonMobil Court:
Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our
holding is to apply prospectively only.
ExxonMobil^ H 24 (emphasis added). According to the Commission, "The Court's
reference to 'further adjudication of its claim for a refund' indicates the retroactive relief
was limited to the refund claim that was before it in that proceeding." Order, p. 11
(R. 519).8
Such a limitation cannot be inferred from the Court's directive that the "claim for a
refund" needed to be remanded for "further adjudication." The recognition that
8

The Commission acknowledged in its Order that the ExxonMobil appeal
concerned multiple "requests for redetermination" where were "combined for the periods
from 1993 through 1998 into one appeal." R. 512 atffif9-10 (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, in a footnote to the same Order, the Commission inexplicably accused
Petitioners of "misleading" the Commission by "characteriz[ing] the Supreme Court's
decision to be one that, according to Petitioner, 'granted ExxonMobil's requests for
severance tax refunds.'" R. 519, n. 4 (emphasis in original). Not only was ExxonMobil
correct in stating that the case involved multiple refund requests, but whether there was
one request or multiple requests is really immaterial to the determination of retroactivity.
19

ExxonMobil is entitled to "further adjudication" of its refund requests in no way
constitutes a limitation on the availability of retroactive relief for claims which had not
yet been filed by Petitioners. It is simply a mandate that the refund action before the
Court required further attention from the Commission to determine the correct amount of
severance tax. The order of remand for the refund requests pending before the Court at
that time should not be interpreted to preclude additional claims by ExxonMobil.
Furthermore, the words immediately following that directive make it abundantly
clear that ExxonMobil has been entirely excluded from the limitation precluding
retroactive relief. Having just referred to ExxonMobil, the Court states "as to other
parties who may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending
before the Tax Commission, our holding is to apply prospectively only." ExxonMobil,
*f 24 (emphasis added). The use of the phrase "other parties" to describe those to whom
the "holding is to apply prospectively only" can only be interpreted to mean that parties
"other" than ExxonMobil are subject to the prospective relief limitation and ExxonMobil
is not.
2.

The application of ExxonMobil to additional claims did not
depend on whether the ExxonMobil Court anticipated,
mentioned, or acknowledged such potential claims.

The Commission also attempted to support its narrow interpretation of the Court's
plain language by suggesting that "If the Court had intended a broader application of the
selective retroactive relief it would have been specific on that point." Order, p. 11
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(R. 519). It observed that "there is no mention, or acknowledgment in the Court's
decision that ExxonMobil might subsequently file additional refund requests for later
periods or different subsidiaries than the 'request for a refund' before the Court in that
proceeding." Order, p. 9 (R. 517). The Commission claimed that Petitioners'
interpretation was not "well-supported" because "that interpretation greatly extends the
Court's limited retroactive application to refund requests unknown to the Court at the
time of the decision." Id, p. 10 (R. 518).
It was not necessary for this Court to speculate on what claims ExxonMobil might
make at some future time. A prospective relief limitation, by its very nature, will permit
application of a court's decision to some claims and preclude application of the law to
other claims. There is no legal basis for the Commission's suggestion that the only claims
to which a decision may apply are those claims which are specifically anticipated or
identified by the court imposing the limitation.9 Clearly the prospective application of the
ExxonMobil decision will be to claims unknown at the time the Court issued the decision.
The fact that the retroactive application authorized for ExxonMobil will also be to claims

9

Although the Rio Algom Court referred to specific claims to which the retroactive
relief would apply, the specificity was necessary to limit the application of the decision to
"the year at issue in this case." Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196. In the absence of that
language, the decision would have been retroactive for all potential claims by the
taxpayer-plaintiffs which were not barred by the statute of limitations. The ExxonMobil
Court did not include a reference to the potential claims to which the decision could be
applied because it was not imposing a similar limitation. Thus, the only limitation on
claims raised by ExxonMobil is the statutory limitations period.
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unknown at the time of the decision does not mean that Petitioners are not entitled to the
relief specifically granted by the ExxonMobil Court.
It is sufficient that the Court held that "as to all but ExxonMobil the rule
announced today is to have prospective application only." ExxonMobil, ^j 23 (emphasis
added). The fact that ExxonMobil was specifically excluded from the group to which the
prospective effect limitation applies, means, in no uncertain terms, that ExxonMobil is
entitled to the retroactive application of ExxonMobil so long as any claims it brings are
within the statutory limitations period. In fact, until January 18, 2008, the Division
believed that the ExxonMobil decision did not preclude additional claims and approved
MEPNA's 1999 refund request based on that understanding:
Q:

For MEPNA you did allow [a refiind] for the 1999 year because you
viewed that they were the entity that the Supreme Court said should
get retroactive relief.

A:

Yes, they were that same entity, and it was the methodology that the
Commissioners had determined.

R. 223 at p. 88:11-16.
The Rio Algom Court decided that the retroactive application of the decision would
be limited to "the year for which [the] suit for refund was brought." Rio Algom, 681 P.2d
at 196. The ExxonMobil Court did not impose a similar limitation. The fact that the
ExxonMobil Court could have, but did not use similar limiting language in fashioning the
relief available to ExxonMobil, compels the conclusion that the Court did not intend to
limit the retroactive relief to only the "year[s] for which this suit for refund was brought."
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Id Contrary to the Commission's claim, ExxonMobil is not asking this Court to "greatly
extend[] the Court's limited retroactive application," Order, p. 10 (R. 518), rather it is
asking this Court to give effect to the plain language of its pronouncement and reverse the
restrictions imposed by the Commission. Just as the Kennecott Court was "cognizant of
the various available options for applying [its] holding in Rio Algom" Kennecott, 862
P.2d at 1350, the ExxonMobil Court was likewise aware of its options at the time it issued
the ExxonMobil decision. Fully aware of those options, the Court "specifically rejected
its application to 'others who [had] litigation pending,'" yet carved out a specific,
unlimited exception for ExxonMobil, stating, "Thus, whether in refund requests or
deficiency proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have
prospective application only." ExxonMobil, ^ 23 (emphasis added). The only reasonable
conclusion which can be drawn from the Court's plain language is that ExxonMobil is
entitled to the retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision for all refund requests
which are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
B.

The Commission Erred In Deciding To Further The ExxonMobil
Court's Policy Considerations "By Interpreting The Court's
Retroactive Application Narrowly."

Because the plain language governing retroactive application to ExxonMobil does
not specifically preclude ExxonMobil from relying on the ExxonMobil decision in other
requests for refunds, the Commission inferred a restriction based on the fact that the
Court's "express language" demonstrated its intention "to limit the refunds that would
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otherwise result from its decision because of the financial impact to governmental
entities." Order, p. 9 (R. 517). According to the Commission "the Court likely intended
to broadly protect the small governmental entities from other refund requests not before
it." Id.9 p. 10 (R. 518). Therefore, the Commission held that the ExxonMobil Court's
"policy considerations [are] best met by interpreting the Court's retroactive application
narrowly to only include the 'refund request' before the court in ExxonMobil
Corporation." Id. The Commission's decision to narrowly interpret the language
granting retroactive relief to ExxonMobil is reversible error for three reasons: First, the
ExxonMobil Court had already weighed the interest of ExxonMobil in retroactive
application of the decision against the Court's concerns for "small governmental entities."
Second, the Commission's decision to narrowly interpret the Court's language ignores the
long-standing principle of liberal interpretation of governing law in favor of the taxpayer.
Third, the Commission should not have given any weight to policy considerations which
the Commission knew were based on mistakes of fact.
1.

The ExxonMobil Court had already weighed the fiscal concerns
against ExxonMobil's right to retroactive relief.

The Commission's reliance on the Court's revenue concerns as justification for its
narrow interpretation of the ExxonMobil decision ignores the fact that, when the Court
decided that ExxonMobil was entitled to retroactive application of its decision, it had
already balanced its revenue concerns against ExxonMobil's right to relief. It recognized
that ExxonMobil had "expended considerable time and resources to attack the actions of
24

the Tax Commission." In view of these significant expenditures, the Court refused to
"deprive ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory and 'potentially]... discourage[e] other
litigants from challenging [actions] of questionable validity." ExxonMobil, % 23. This
was the same analysis undertaken by this Court in V-l Oil wherein the Court ruled the
challenged statute was unconstitutional, but held that V-l Oil was entitled to retroactive
application of its decision, not only for the years specifically addressed by the complaint,
but for all years during which it had been paying the unconstitutional tax:
Prospective application of our decision to V-l, the only party to this appeal,
would have the potential of discouraging other litigants from challenging
statutes of questionable validity. Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196. Indeed, we
have said in the past that it would be unconscionable to deprive the litigant
who has sustained the burden of attacking an unconstitutional statute of the
fruits of victory. Therefore as to V-l our decision is retroactive to the year
in which V-l alleges it began to pay the surcharge, subject only to any
applicable statutes of limitations and to the extent that V-l can demonstrate
that it paid the surcharge on motor fuels. See Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196.
V-l Oil Co,, 942 P.2d at 915 (citations omitted).
Like the V-l Oil Court, the ExxonMobil Court also felt that the interest of the
litigant who "expended considerable time and resources to attack the actions of the Tax
Commission" outweighed the policy considerations on which the prospective effect
limitation was based. ExxonMobil, H 23. In both cases this Court did not restrict the
plaintiffs' right to retroactive application of the decision to claims which were not barred
by applicable statutes of limitations. It was not the province of the Commission to further
restrict that relief in the interest of articulated policy considerations already considered
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and weighed by the ExxonMobil Court. Because this Court has already determined that
ExxonMobil's right to relief outweighed the revenue concerns, the Commission erred
when it held that the revenue concerns addressed by the ExxonMobil Court were "best
met by interpreting the Court's retroactive application narrowly." Order, p. 10 (R. 518).
2.

The Commission's decision to narrowly interpret the retroactive
relief available to ExxonMobil ignores long-standing policy of
interpreting applicable law in favor of the taxpayer.

The ExxonMobil Court recognized that, where statutory language is not plain, a
court cannot ignore its "mandate that taxing statutes be construed in favor of the
taxpayer." ExxonMobil, \ 14. If there is any ambiguity, then principles of statutory
interpretation which favor the taxpayer should likewise be applied to the interpretation of
case law. The Commission's decision to "narrow" the scope of retroactive relief to
advance the ExxonMobil Court's policy considerations ignores the mandate to interpret
applicable law "liberally in favor of the taxpayer." Id. at ^J19. Commissioner Dixon
dissented from the Commission's Order, expressing her concern for the Commission's
departure from interpretive principles which favor taxpayers as follows:
In the end, I am most wary of the precedent the Majority opinion sets
for subsequent taxpayers and entities seeking administrative remedy
and relief based on a court decision.
It is an often-cited principle to be cautious when interpreting tax
statutes against taxpayers. As the Supreme Court wrote in County Board of
Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State Tax Commission and
Strawberry Water Users Association (Utah 1997):
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It is an established rule in the construction of tax
statutes that if any doubt exists as to the meaning of the
statute, 'our practice is to construe taxation statutes liberally
in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify
an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists.' Salt
Lake County v. State Tax Commission 779 P.2d 1131, 1132
(Utah 1989).
If there is any ambiguity in the reading and application of
retroactivity and prospectivity as it relates to the Court's cases, I have
applied that principle in favor of the taxpayer.
Order, pp. 17-18 (R. 525-526) (emphasis in original).
ExxonMobil does not believe that there is any ambiguity in the Court's ruling on
prospectivity and that the Commission's decision to "interpret^ the Court's retroactive
relief narrowly" is an abuse of its authority. Id, p. 10 (R. 518). However, if this Court
believes that its declarations regarding ExxonMobil's right to retroactive application of
the ExxonMobil decision were less than clear, then the standard of interpretation of a
judicial opinion should be the same as the principles governing interpretations of a
statute.10 The Commission's decision to "interpret^ the Court's retroactive application
narrowly," impermissibly expands the scope of the ExxonMobil Court's prospective relief
limitation.

10

ExxonMobil recognizes that this Court, as the author of the ExxonMobil decision,
has the right to provide any interpretation it sees fit, and, if it so desires, may alter, amend,
or overrule its own pronouncements. However, because the Commission is a subordinate
adjudicatory body, ExxonMobil believes its interpretation should be guided by wellestablished principles of interpretation.
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3-

The Commission should not have championed the ExxonMobil
Court's policy considerations which the Commission knew were
based on factual errors.

The Commission's attempt to justify restricting the retroactive relief available to
ExxonMobil in order to further the "policy considerations" of the ExxonMobil Court is
especially troubling inasmuch as the Commission is fully aware that those "policy
considerations" were based on mistakes of fact. In a recent appeal before this Court, to
which the Commission was a party, Union Oil Company demonstrated that the
prospective relief limitation was based on the misapprehension of certain facts. The
Commission did not rebut those claims. For example, Union Oil Company demonstrated
that, contrary to the ExxonMobil Court's suggestion, the wholesale application of the
ExxonMobil decision would not have impacted "other small governmental entities"
because, with the exception of the severance taxes allocated to the amici funds, all of the
remaining taxes are remitted to the State's General Fund. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-115
(copy of statute provided at Addendum 3). Union Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n,
Case No. 20080068-SC, Opening Brief of Petitioner, pp. 22-23 (filed May 27, 2008),
portions of relevant pleading attached hereto at Addendum 4. In addition, the decision to
limit application of the decision to protect the amici funds ignored the fact that the only
time the amici funds would be impacted was when the wells were actually located on
Indian lands. Id. at 20-22, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-116 and 119 (copies of statutes
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provided at Addendum 3).u Whether the amici funds would have even been impacted by
refund requests was questionable inasmuch as the refund given to ExxonMobil had been
issued from the State's General Fund, rather than the amici funds. Unocal also pointed
out that the prospective relief limitation resulted in a significant windfall to the amici and
the General Fund because the ExxonMobil Court held that the correct interpretation of the
statute would not apply to taxpayers who had paid their severance taxes correctly.
The Commission was fully aware of these facts on or about May 27, 2008, when
Unocal filed its Opening Brief, and did not rebut these facts in its Respondent's Brief
filed July 21, 2008. Nevertheless, in its Order issued on November 17, 2008-nearly six
months after the Opening Brief in the Unocal matter had been filed-the Commission used
the Court's concern for the '"burden on the amici revitalization fluids and other relatively
small governmental entities'" to justify its narrow interpretation of the scope of
retroactive relief available to ExxonMobil. Order, p. 10 (R. 518), quoting ExxonMobil,
^ 23. The furtherance of the Court's flawed "policy considerations" did not justify
ignoring the Court's plain language which, by the Commission's own admission, could
"be interpreted to allow other claims by ExxonMobil." Id, p. 11 (R. 519). The

1

Although the wells operated by MEPNA and ExxonMobil are on Indian lands,
the fact remains that many oil and gas wells are not on Indian lands and that the
ExxonMobil decision did not take this fact into account when it refused to make its
interpretation of severance tax provisions applicable to all severance taxpayers. This
error demonstrates that the issue of potential harm to trust fund lands and "other small
governmental entities" "did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues
actually litigated in the lower courts." Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91.
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Commission's insistence that a "narrow interpretation" was essential to further policy
considerations which the Commission knew were based on factual errors is insupportable.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE PROSPECTIVE RELIEF
LIMITATION ADOPTED IN EXXONMOBIL.
If this Court concludes that the retroactive relief approved by the ExxonMobil

Court did not extend to the claims at issue in this appeal, then Petitioners request that this
Court reexamine and reverse the ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation.
After this Court issued the ExxonMobil decision, the amicus oil and gas companies
filed a Petition for Rehearing on the issue of prospectivity. Petitioners did not join in the
petition because they understood the Court's decision to mean that Petitioners were
entitled to the full retroactive application of the decision for the claim before the Court, in
addition to any future refund claims which were not barred by the statute of limitations.
Because Petitioners believed they would receive the retroactive application of the
decision, they did not believe they had any interest in the Petition for Rehearing filed by
the amicus parties.12
The decision to adopt a prospective relief limitation in ExxonMobil ignored the
requirement that "the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
12

At the time the petition was pending, an amendment to Rule 35 was also pending
which would prohibit an amicus party from filing a petition for rehearing. Utah R. App.
P., Rule 35(e). That amendment (which was adopted by April 1, 2004) was referred to by
the Commission in its memorandum opposing rehearing on the basis that amicus parties
did not have standing to request a rehearing. Because the Court denied the petition
without explanation, it is not clear whether the petition was denied on its merits or for
lack of standing.
30

principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have
relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed." Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-107. When this Court rejected the
Commission's interpretation of the statute, it did not "establish new law," but merely
"state[d] the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Malan, 693
P.2d at 676.
The Court's decision to deny retroactive relief because the ExxonMobil decision
resulted in "rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities" ignores the fact that
the Commission's misinterpretation of the severance tax provisions was not established
law. Compare Loyal Order of Moose v. County Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 259
(Utah 1982) (law upon which taxpayers had relied was the result of judicial decisions
which spanned decades). The Court's decision to deny taxpayers the right to retroactive
application of ExxonMobil because it conflicted with the Commission's erroneous
interpretation of severance tax laws cannot be reconciled with the fact that an agency's
interpretation of statute is given no deference by reviewing courts. Sullivan v. Utah Bd.
of Oil Gas & Mining, 2008 UT 44, 189 P.3d 63 ^[9-10 ("We review an administrative
agency's 'interpretation of its statutorily granted powers and authority as a question of
law, with no deference to the agency's view of the law.'"). Under the precedent
established by ExxonMobil, an agency's misinterpretation of law, once corrected, may
now become binding law for the time period preceding the Court's clarification!
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The Court also accepted at face value "[t]he revenue concerns cited by the Tax
Commission and amici," even though "the full breadth and depth of the [alleged] impact
[was] not immediately apparent from the record." ExxonMobil, ^j 23. In the wake of the
ExxonMobil decision, as pertinent facts which contradict the Commission's and amici's
representations have come to light, it is apparent that the Court's decision to limit the
application of ExxonMobil "did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues
actually litigated in the lower courts." Munson, 2007 UT 91, ^j 21. The Court's
unprecedented decision to apply a prospective relief limitation to a matter of statutory
interpretation has led to substantial inequities which were not fully considered and were
likely not foreseen by the ExxonMobil Court.
A.

The ExxonMobil Court Erred When It Imposed A Prospective Relief
Limitation Because Interpretations of Statutes Do Not "Establish A
New Principle Of Law,"

Until the issuance of the ExxonMobil decision, this Court had consistently applied
the three-factor test announced in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson to determine whether the
prospective application of that decision was appropriate.13 The first Chevron Oil factor
requires that "the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle

i3

In Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), the Court
overturned Chevron Oil and held that "[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to
the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be
given full retroactive in all cases still open on direct review .. .." Many state courts,
including Utah's, have interpreted the Harper decision to apply specifically to issues of
federal law and have continued to use the Chevron Oil test to determine whether a new
principle of state law should be applied retroactively.
32

of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."
Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (emphasis added). If this element is not satisfied, there
is no need to evaluate the remaining factors.14
In all cases prior to ExxonMobil in which this Court gave prospective effect to its
decision, this Court had created new law by either (1) striking down a tax statute as
unconstitutional, V-l Oil, 942 P.2d 906 (determined statute violated state constitution);
Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water
Conservancy DisL, 690 P.2d 562 (1984) (statute allowing district court to appoint board
of directors of water conservancy districts held unconstitutional); Rio Algom Corp., 681
P.2d 184 (taxing statute held unconstitutional); or (2) reversing itself with regard to a
long-standing judicial interpretation of a statutory provision upon which litigants had
justifiably relied. Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265 (Court gave prospective effect
to its correction of "an interpretation of law that has been relied on [since 1911]."). The
ExxonMobil decision represents an abrupt departure from well-established jurisprudence.
The issue before the ExxonMobil Court concerned the interpretation of a severance
tax statute. The statute was not ruled unconstitutional, nor did the Court's interpretation
"overrule] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied." Chevron Oil, 404

14

Those factors include "whether retrospective operation will further or retard [the
new law's] operation" and whether "substantial inequitable results" will occur if the new
law is applied retroactively. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07.
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U.S. at 106. This Court has long recognized that, in matters of statutory interpretation,
"the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and
prospectively." Malan, 693 P.2d at 675. Thus, when a court answers "a specific question
about the meaning of a statute, [its] initial interpretation does not announce a new rule of
law." Fiore v. White, 562 Pa. 634, 644, 757 A.2d 842, 848 (2000).15
In several recent cases, courts have held that interpretations of statutes do not
"establish a new principle of law" as required by Chevron Oil, and have denied requests
to make those interpretations prospective only. For example, in Clark v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1234, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003), the insurer argued that a decision
interpreting a Colorado statute ("Brennan") had announced a new rule of law and should
not be applied to a subsequent case arising out of facts which had occurred prior to the
issuance of that decision. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the
Brennan decision "involved the interpretation of a statute . . . [it] did not establish a new
principle of law. Thus, it does not satisfy the first [Chevron Oil] factor and . .. Brennan
must be applied retroactively." Id.

15

This fact explains why the distinction between creating new law, i.e. statutes
which are found unconstitutional, versus interpretations of existing law is so important.
A publicly elected Legislature enacts law as the representatives of the people. When a
statute is deemed unconstitutional, it still represents the Legislature's intention regarding
that law. Therefore, although prospective effect of an unconstitutional statute may seem
unfair, the statute, nevertheless, represents the intended will of the elected Legislature. In
contrast, when a statute is interpreted and a Court refuses to give retroactive effect to that
interpretation, it is disregarding the intention and will of the Legislature, thus usurping the
role of the Legislature.
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In Broyles v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 695 P.2d 1136, 1144 (Colo. 1985), the plaintiff
argued that a prior decision ("De Beque") should not be applied retroactively to facts
which occurred prior to the issuance of the decision. The Colorado Supreme Court
refused to limit the application of the prior decision, stating:
In De Beque, however, we did not establish a new principle of law. Rather,
we merely interpreted and applied a statute that was enacted prior to the
time Broyles was required to file his application. Accordingly any
contention that De Beque, or the filing requirement of section 37-92-301(4),
is inapplicable to this case is erroneous.
Id., at 1144 (emphasis added).
In Sodexho Marriott Mgmt. v. United States, 61 Fed. CI. 229, 238 (Fed. CI. 2004
the court held that a prior decision did not create new law and must be given full
retroactive effect because it "merely interpreted and applied a statute," stating:
Because Pacrim Pizza involved the interpretation of a statute enacted prior
to the time the Contract was issued, it did not establish a new principle of
law. See Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1234, 1242
(10th Cir. 2003) (applying the Chevron Oil factors, which the Colorado
Supreme Court adopted as the retroactivity standards for civil cases, to
determine whether or not to apply a relevant state decision retroactively).
Thus, the first Chevron Oil factor would not be satisfied, and it would be
proper to apply the interpretation of sections 1346(a)(2) and 1491(a)(1)
contained in Pacrim Pizza retroactively.
Id. (emphasis added).
The ExxonMobil decision clearly concerned a matter of statutory interpretation. In
stating the applicable standard of review, the Court indicated that it was "reviewing] the
Tax Commission's interpretations of the various statutory provisions implicated in this
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matter." ExxonMobil, % 10 (emphasis added). The Court concluded the statute in
question was ambiguous and applied "the general principle that we 'construe taxation
statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer . .. ." Id., If 19. Applying that standard, the
Court held "that valuation does not necessarily occur at the point of sale, wherever that
may be, but rather in the immediate vicinity of the point at which the oil or gas is
physically removed from the earth." Id. Because the ExxonMobil decision was purely a
matter of statutory interpretation, this Court should have recognized that its ruling
"state[d] the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively," and allowed
retroactive application without restriction. Malan, 693 P.2d at 675.
The ExxonMobil decision also did not create new law by "deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at
106-107. Prior to the ExxonMobil decision, there were only two other cases which
addressed the meaning of "at the well" and, in both cases, the decisions supported
ExxonMobil's interpretation of the severance tax provisions. In Belnorth Petroleum
Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 845 P.2d 266, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Court of
Appeals held that the term "at the well" indicated that "the legislature opted not to tax the
[producer's] gross receipts." In Appeal No. 88-1676, p. 4, the Commission held that "the
clear and literal meaning of... 'at the well' means the gross value of those products at
Ihe point of their removal from the well." All available precedent supported
ExxonMobil's interpretation of the severance tax provisions.
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Further! nine, the Court resolved the issue of statutory interpretation by following
its "mandate that taxing statutes be construed in favor of the taxpayer," ExxonMobil, \ 14,
and by heeding the requirement that the Court "harmonizfe] the various definitions at play
in the severance tax statute." Id. at f 20. The ExxonMobil Court's adherence to these
well-established principles and the resulting statutory interpretation was foreseeable, and
thus the Court's decision did not establish "new law," but merely provided the correct
interpretation of existing law. Nevertheless, the ExxonMobil Court seems to have
concluded that its decision created "new law" inasmuch as it characterized the decision as
resulting in "rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities." Id. at 123
The Commission's denials of ExxonMobil's refund requests were based on its
interpretation of the same severance tax provisions ultimately interpreted by the
ExxonMobil Court. The fact that the Court struck down the Commission's interpretation
does not mean that the Court created new laws "contrary to those relied on by the taxing
authorities." Id. The fact that new law was not created is illustrated by the contrast
between the ExxonMobil statutory interpretation issue and the Loyal Order of Moose case
wherein the Court clearly identified a specific line of cases giving an expansive
interpretation to the phrase "exclusive use." Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265-266.
In contrast, there was no separate set of "rules relied on by the taxing authorities" in
ExxonMobil. The only basis for the Commission's denial of the refund requests was its
own misinterpretation of the statute. If the Chevron Oil standard of creating "new law" is
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satisfied any time the Court reverses an agency's interpretation of a statute, then under
ExxonMobil the agency will be able to enforce its misinterpretation for all time periods
preceding the Court's clarification and the only aggrieved parties for whom relief will be
available are the ones who win the race to the courthouse.
The Court's decision that it has created "new law" when it corrects an agency's
persistent misinterpretation of a statute, ignores the fact that this same Court has
consistently recognized the right of a court to review an agency's interpretation of a
statute without giving any deference to the agency's interpretation. Sullivan, 2008 UT
f^J 9-10 ("We review an administrative agency's 'interpretation of its statutorily granted
powers and authority as a question of law, with no deference to the agency's view of the
law.'"), accordBevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
Bennion v. Graham Resources, 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e review the Board's
interpretation of the applicable statutes for correctness and give its view on the matter no
particular deference."). If a court owes no deference to the agency's interpretation of a
statute, then it should not empower that agency to enforce its misinterpretation once the
court has provided the correct statutory interpretation. Yet that is exactly what happened
in ExxonMobil.
When the ExxonMobil Court refused to give retroactive effect to the correct
interpretation of the statute, the Division not only denied refund requests based on the
correct interpretation of the severance tax laws, but also began issuing deficiency
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assessments by which it has sought to enforce its misinterpretation of the severance tax
provisions for periods predating the ExxonMobil decision. Because the Court deprived
taxpayers of the right to rely on the ExxonMobil decision, the Commission has
successfully enforced its misinterpretation of the statute, giving it the weight of
established law. Even though the agency's interpretation of the statute carries no weight
when a court reviews that interpretation, the effect of the ExxonMobil decision has been
to make the agency's misinterpretation the law in effect for the time periods predating the
ExxonMobil decision. This result is inconsistent with the well-established standard of
review and disregards the role of the legislature in creating law.
The ExxonMobil Court found that its interpretation was harmonious with the other
severance tax provisions and was consistent with legislative intent. The Court
acknowledged that the correct interpretation "must give meaning and relevance to eacn of
the valuation methods," ExxonMobil, H 16, and rejected the Commission's interpretation
of the statute because it could not be "reconcile[d] with the valuation provisions of the
severance tax statutes." Id. at ^f 15. It concluded that "[t]he language of the statute
contemplates calculation within the immediate vicinity of the point of removal from the
earth, but it also compels calculation at some point where sales are not a distinct rarity."
Id. at f 20. Despite the Court's pronouncements on the meaning of the statute, its
decision on retroactivity has resulted in the Commission's enforcement of an
interpretation of severance tax law which was not intended by the Legislature and was
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specifically rejected by this Court. If the ExxonMobil decision on retroactivity is not
reversed, then the role of the legislature in creating laws is suspended until a Court
provides the interpretation of that law. Until then, an agency is free to misinterpret and
misapply law with the added assurance that its misinterpretation will be enforceable for
the time periods preceding judicial correction of its misinterpretation.
B.

The ExxonMobil Court's Conclusion That The Prospective Relief
Limitation Was Necessary To "Protect The Solvency Of
Governmental Entities And To Avoid Administrative Hardship"
Was Reversible Error.

There is no precedent which would allow a court to resort to equitable
considerations to support its refusal to retroactively apply its decision when the first
Chevron Oil factor has not been satisfied. Nevertheless, the ExxonMobil Court did just
that when it concluded that the prospective relief limitation was necessary to "protect the
solvency of governmental entities and to avoid administrative and financial hardship
caused by retroactive application of rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing
authorities." ExxonMobil, f 23. This conclusion was clearly erroneous and does not
support the Court's decision to limit the application of ExxonMobil.
In Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, this Court did not hesitate to overrule a
decision which had been made without thorough analysis of the issue when subsequent
events demonstrated that the decision was clearly erroneous, stating:
Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we may overrule it
where "the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to
render the prior decision inapplicable."
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Id, 2007 UT 91, U 20, quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994).16
This case presents a similar dilemma where precedent with unforeseen ramifications was
created by last minute arguments raised by amici parties on an issue which "did not
benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues actually litigated in the lower
courts." Id11
16

In Munson, the District Court had barred the plaintiffs medical expert from
testifying on the grounds that statutory confidentiality requirements had been violated.
The district court's decision was based on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Doe v.
Maret, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1999), wherein the appellant had successfully argued in her
reply brief to this Court that the appellee's attachment of a notice of intent to his appellate
brief violated statutory requirements of confidentiality. Based on the Maret decision, the
district court concluded that Munson's disclosure to her expert witness of documents
obtained in proceedings before a prelitigation panel violated statutory confidentiality
requirements and disqualified the expert. This Court reviewed the facts of the case and
observed that the disclosed documents had been created by Munson's own counsel and
consulting expert and, therefore, Munson was free to disclose those documents and waive
any privilege attached thereto.
I
17

The Munson Court explained that the precedential value of the prior decision on
confidentiality of the prelitigation material was minimal in light of the circumstances
which gave rise to that ruling:
Our decision to overrule the last paragraph of Maret is supported by the fact
that it "is not the most weighty of precedents." Id. at 399. The paragraph at
issue was appended to our opinion in Maret almost as an afterthought.
Indeed, we devoted only a single paragraph to our analysis of the issue, an
analysis consisting almost entirely of a conclusory sentence asserting that
because the notice of intent is part of the proceedings, it must be kept
confidential. This lack of analysis, combined with the unique way in which
the issue was presented, reduces the precedential value of the applicable
language. Unlike the vast majority of cases in which we either affirm or
assign error to a decision by a lower court, in Maret we were asked to
exercise our inherent jurisdiction over the proceedings before us to impose
sanctions for an act that occurred during briefing. Because of this unique
procedural posture, the issue did not benefit from the focus and refinement
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After the Commission filed its Opening Brief in the ExxonMobil appeal, the
Navajo Revitalization Fund and the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund (the "Amici
Funds") jointly filed an amicus brief wherein they argued that, if the Court reversed the
Commission's decision, the decision should be applied prospectively to avoid alleged
catastrophic budget and solvency problems. Neither the Commission nor other amici
requested or discussed a prospective relief limitation in their briefing to this Court. The
Court acknowledged that the evidence provided by the Amici Funds, on which it based its
unprecedented decision, was scant stating, "the full breadth and depth of the impact is not
immediately apparent from the record." ExxonMobil, U 23. Nevertheless, the Court held
that "[t]he revenue concerns cited by the Tax Commission and amici convince us that
application of our prospective effect doctrine is appropriate in this case." Id.
Specifically the Court observed that "[l]arge refunds of money already collected and spent
would pose a great burden on the amici revitalization funds and other relatively small
governmental entities operating on correspondingly small budgets." Id. Consequently,
the Court ruled that the statutory interpretation provided in ExxonMobil would not apply

afforded issues actually litigated in the lower courts. Moreover, because the
issue was first raised in a reply brief, we were not able to benefit from any
adversarial briefing of the issue. We accordingly conclude that it is
appropriate to overrule the last paragraph of our opinion in Doe v. Maret.
A/., 2007 UT 91,1(21.
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to "other parties [besides ExxonMobil | w ho may have refund requests, deficiency
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission." Id. at f 24.
This decision constitutes reversible error under Munson for three reasons. First,
the assertions upon which the Court concluded a "great burden" would occur have been
largely disproved by subsequent events and revelations. Second, the retroactive
application of ExxonMobil would not have created administrative hardship. Third, the
Court's refusal to retroactively apply ExxonMobil has resulted in a revenue windfall at the
expense of taxpayers who are left with no legal means to obtain a refund of illegally
collected taxes.
L

Facts revealed subsequent to the ExxonMobil decision
demonstrate that the Court's concern for "amici revitalization
funds and other relatively small governmental entities" was
misplaced.

Since the issuance of the ExxonMobil decision, it has become clear that the threat
to the solvency of "amici revitalization funds and other relatively small governmental
entities" was exaggerated.18 For example, the only time the Amici Funds are impacted by
severance taxes is when the producing wells are located on Indian lands. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 59-5-116 and 119. Yet the Court made the prospective relief limitation applicable to
all oil and gas producers, even those whose wells were not located on Indian lands. In

18

ExxonMobil is not suggesting that the Amici Funds or the Commission
intentionally exaggerated the solvency concerns. Certainly the exaggeration which
occurred could have been the result of the fact that the only party which briefed this issue
was the Amici Funds and that this issue had not been raised before the Commission.
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addition, it is not even clear that the Amici Funds would ever be impacted by refunds
because there was no evidence that the refunds would have to be issued by the Amici
Fund. In fact, the refund issued to ExxonMobil was not issued by the Amici Funds, but
by the State's General Fund.
It has also become clear that the Court's concern for "other relatively small
governmental entities" was also misplaced inasmuch as any severance tax money which
does not go to the Amici Funds goes directly to the State General Fund. Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-5-115. Thus, there were no other "small governmental entities" which could have
been negatively impacted by the Court's decision.
Finally, the revenue concerns addressed by the ExxonMobil Court are not
implicated by deficiency assessments. Nevertheless, by prohibiting the retroactive
application of ExxonMobil "whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings," the
Court ensured that taxpayers who paid their severance taxes using the correct
interpretation of law, would be forced to pay millions of dollars in deficiency
assessments. The Court's decision to prohibit taxpayers who were involved in pending
deficiency proceedings from relying on ExxonMobil, has resulted in an unfair windfall to
the government, and, when the wells are on Indian lands, to the revitalization funds.
Ironically, immediately prior to imposing the prospective relief limitation, the
Court observed that, when its interpretation of a statute results in a shortfall of anticipated
revenue, the Legislature has the right to correct the problem by amending the statute:
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If the legislature established the severance tax scheme to realize a specific
revenue target and our interpretation of its statutory language does not
provide that level of revenue, the legislature may amend the relevant
statutes to provide for a different calculation of the tax that will achieve the
desired revenue.
Id., T| 22. Despite this recognition of legislative authority to remedy the unforeseen fiscal
impact of a court's statutory interpretation, the Court usurped that legislative prerogative
by depriving taxpayers (other than ExxonMobil) of the right to rely on the correct
interpretation of the statute when their severance taxes are calculated.
2.

The ExxonMobil Court erred when it concluded that retroactive
application of the decision would have resulted in administrative
hardship.
I

The ExxonMobil Court also concluded that retroactive application of ExxonMobil
would have resulted in "administrative .. . hardship." ExxonMobil, ^ 23. Ironically, the
"administrative hardship" is the direct result of the Commission's continued refusal to
correctly interpret the severance tax provisions. The suggestion that the retroactive
application of the correct statutory interpretation (as opposed to a change in law) results
in an administrative hardship because taxing entities may have to issue refunds is
unprecedented.
In Loyal Order of Moose, this Court postponed the effective date of its decision
overruling a prior interpretation of a statute to avoid the administrative hardship which
would result from retroactive assessments and to avoid financially burdening the
taxpayers:
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Also, if the rule were to be given retroactive effect, the assessment of back
taxes on properties affected by this rule might well result in an unreasonable
burden upon all those organizations and governmental bodies associated
with it. By staying the effective date of our ruling in this case, not only are
court and agency resources saved, but time also is allowed for organizations
affected to make needed adjustments.
Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265. The ExxonMobil Court disregarded the impact
on taxpayers when it refused to allow retroactive application of the decision.
Prior to ExxonMobil, there were some taxpayers which had paid their severance
taxes under the correct interpretation of the severance tax laws. Notwithstanding prior
contrary administrative and judicial decisions inteipreting "at the well," the Division
continued to deny refund requests and issue deficiency assessments based on its
misinterpretation of severance tax laws. The position taken by the Division and the
Commission directly resulted in an accumulation of severance tax appeals over a number
of years. The hardship, if it existed, was a direct result of the agency's persistent refusal
to accept what was ultimately determined to be the correct interpretation of the severance
tax provisions.
Because severance taxes had been paid based on conflicting interpretations of the
severance tax laws, whatever interpretation the Court adopted would have necessarily
resulted in some administrative activities. Nevertheless, the ExxonMobil Court concluded
that the only way to avoid administrative hardship was to deprive severance taxpayers of
the retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision-thus insuring that the state general
fund and the revitalization funds would receive an unexpected windfall from those parties
46

who had paid severance taxes under the correct interpretation of the severance tax
statutes. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Department of Revenue, 161 Ariz.
135, 138-39, 776 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1989) ("An honorable government would not keep
taxes to which it is not entitled.").
In addition to enforcing deficiency assessments which were pending during the
ExxonMobil decision, the Commission has interpreted the Court's prospective relief
limitation to authorize additional severance tax deficiency assessments against taxpayers
which paid their severance taxes based on the correct interpretation of the severance tax
provisions prior to the ExxonMobil decision. This result was prohibited by this Court in
Loyal Order of Moose when the Court postponed the effective date of its decision
because "if the rule were to be given retroactive effect, the assessment of back taxes on
properties affected by this rule might well result in an unreasonable burden." Loyal
Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265. The Division's issuance of post-ExxonMobil
deficiency assessments demonstrates the error in the Court's conclusion that
administrative hardship would have resulted from retroactive application of its decision
inasmuch as the Division is willing to undergo administrative activity to obtain additional
revenue under an interpretation of the severance tax laws which was rejected by the
ExxonMobil Court. Inasmuch as the Division is not deterred by "administrative hardship"
associated with deficiency assessments, it is disingenuous to suggest that allowing refund
requests under ExxonMobil would have resulted in "administrative hardship."
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3,

The prospective relief limitation deprives taxpayers of their
statutory right to a refund of illegally assessed taxes.

The Court's conclusion that "administrative hardship" forecloses the right to a
refund effectively repeals the taxpayer's statutory right to a refund of illegally collected
taxes. The refund of taxes illegally collected is a statutory obligation:
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for public revenue
which is deemed unlawful by the party whose property is taxed, or from
whom the tax or license is demanded or enforced, that party may pay under
protest the tax or license, or any part deemed unlawful, to the officers
designated and authorized by law to collect the tax or license; and then the
party so paying or a legal representative may bring an action in the tax
division of the appropriate district court against the officer to whom the tax
or license was paid, or against the state, county, municipality, or other
taxing entity on whose behalf it was collected, to recover the tax or license
or any portion of the tax or license paid under protest.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301. The ExxonMobil Court's conclusion that the fulfillment of
this statutory responsibility results in an "administrative hardship," effectively repeals this
statute for all taxpayers seeking a refund. Certainly the issuance of a refund has a
financial impact on the entities which receive taxes. However, statutes of limitations are
the means utilized by the legislature to protect governmental solvency. Thus, when the
taxing provisions are misapplied or misinterpreted, a taxpayer has the legal right, under
the laws of this state, to request a refund or to challenge a deficiency so long as the action
is initiated in a timely manner. Tucson Elec. Power Co. v. Apache Co., 185 Ariz. 5, 20,
912 P.2d 9, 24 (Ariz. App. 1995) ("[W]e find it difficult to conceive how requiring the
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state and the affected counties to refund the proceeds of an illegal tax to those who paid it
under protest could be viewed as 'substantially inequitable.'").
The Court's decision to limit the application of ExxonMobil is dangerous
precedent which invites abuse of taxing powers. The ExxonMobil prospective relief
proclamation permits the Commission and other taxing entities to apply taxing provisions
in a manner which allows them to collect taxes to which they are not legally entitled.
They may persist in their denial of refund requests and continue to seek deficiencies
under their statutory misinterpretations until this Court ultimately provides the correct
interpretation of the statute. Once a judicial interpretation of that statute is rendered, the
taxing entities could request a prospective relief limitation simply by alleging
"administrative and financial hardship." The longer the taxing entities have persisted in
their misapplication of the statute, the greater their alleged financial interest will be. The
practical result of the ExxonMobil Court's refusal to give retroactive effect to its
interpretation of a tax statute is to give taxing entities virtual immunity from refund
actions and deficiency proceedings. Under ExxonMobil, the only taxpayer which would
receive retroactive relief when a tax statute is finally given the correct interpretation
would be the one which wins the race to the courthouse. As a result, all other taxpayers,
otherwise entitled to relief under Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-301 (refund actions) and 59-1-
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501 (deficiency proceedings), would be denied refunds or forced to pay an illegal
deficiency despite statutory mechanisms designed to prevent this injustice.l9
CONCLUSION
In view of the ExxonMobil Court's specific exclusion of ExxonMobil from the
prospective effect limitation, this Court should reverse the Commission's narrowing of
the scope of retroactive relief authorized by the Court for ExxonMobil and direct the
Commission to issue the refunds requested by ExxonMobil and MEPNA. Alternatively,
Petitioners would request that this Court reconsider and reverse its imposition of the
prospective effect limitation in ExxonMobil.
DATED this 21st day of May, 2009.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

David J. Crapo
Attorneys for Petitioner

l9

Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, a severance taxpayer which believes it has
overpaid severance taxes has the legal right to "requestf] an adjudicative proceeding and
the correction of the assessed tax." As a result of ExxonMobil's prospective relief
proclamation, the Commission is stripped of the ability to "correct" a tax assessment
which does not comply with statutory provisions.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Commission on Petitioners' Motion for Summary judgment filed on
February 26, 2008 ("Motion")

In the Motion, Petitioners request that the Commission grant summary

judgment to ExxonMobil by ordering the Division to grant ExxonMobil's and MEPNA's refund requests.
Respondent submitted a Response to Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment on April 4,2008. Petitioner
submitted aReply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on April 25,2008. A Hearing
on the Motion for Summary Judgment was held on June 17, 2008.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
Under Rule 56 of the Utah rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate where
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled a judgment as a matter of law.
Sorremon v Beers, 585 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 1978); Utah Department of Environmental Quality v Wind
River Petroleum, 881 P.2d 868 (Utah 1994). On Summary Judgment, all facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn from those facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wayment v Clear
Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25, 116 P.3d 271. A summary judgment shall be rendered by the Tax
Commission, "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 1o any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Utah R. Civ.P. 56; Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-l(4).)
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are material to the Commission's decision on Petitioners' Motion and are
undisputed:
1.

Exxon Mobil Corporation ("ExxonMobil**) is the result of a merger, on November 30,1999,

between Mobil Corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exxon Corporation.
Prior to the merger Mobil Exploration and Producing North American ("MEPNA,r) was a

2.

wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil Corporation. As a result of the merger, MEPNA became a second-tier,
wholly-owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil.
3.

MEPNA still exists today as a separate legal entity.

4.

During the 1990's MEPNA owned and operated oil and gas producing wells within the

Greater Aneth Field in Southern Utah. Those wells were located in the McElmo Creek Unit and the
Ratherford Unit. The records of the Utah Division of Oil and Gas Mining ("DOGMA") identify MEPNA as
the operator of the McElmo Creek unit from April L 1986 through May ,1,2001, and of the Ratherford unit
from September 1,1993 through May 1,2001. After May 1,2001, the DOGMA records identify the operator
of both the McElmo Creek and Ratherford units as ExxonMobil Oil Corp.
5.

Prior to the merger, MEPNA had owned 39.956% of the production from the McElmo Creek

Unit Exxon Corporation owned 24.787% and the remainder of the production was owned by Texaco and The
Bureau of Indian Affairs.
6.

Prior to the merger, MEPNA had owned 64.367% of the production from the Ratherford Unit

Exxon Corporation did not own any production from that field. The remaining production was owned by
Texaco, Chieftan and The Bureau of Indian Affairs.
7

Prom 1993 through 1998, MEPNA filed returns and paid severance taxes on its production of
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oil and gas from the Greater Aneth Fieid by calculating the value of the oil on the price that was paid at the
point of sale. *
8.

After the merger, in 1999, ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns, amending the

original returns fded by MEPNA for the 1993 through 1998 tax years. The amended severance tax returns
were based on the value of the oil produced using the net-back method, which resulted in lower tax amounts
than MEPNA had claimed on the original severance tax returns for each of the years.
9.

The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission dented ExxonMobil's requests for

refund regarding the returns originally filed by MEPNA for the 1993 through 1998 tax years.
10.

ExxonMobil appealed the denial of the refund requests to the Utah State Tax Commission,

The requests for redetermination of the refund claims for overpayment of taxes paid by MEPNA were
combined for the periods from 1993 through 1998 into one appeal, which was identified as ExxonMobil
Corporation v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal No. 00-0901 (the "Original
Appeal"). After a Formal Hearing, the Commission upheld the Division's denial of the combined refund
requests.
11.

ExxonMobil appealed the Commission's decision in the Original Appeal to the Utah Supreme

12.

Because MEPNA was a wholly owned subsidiary of ExxonMobil all litigation surrounding

Court.

the refund requests was managed and financed by ExxonMobil.
13.

The Utah Supreme Court issued its decision on November 25, 2003, in ExxonMobil

Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2003 UT 53, 87 P.3d 706 (2003), remandingthe matter back to

1 Whether these calculations by MEPNA were made using the first method required by Utah Code Ann, Sec. 59-5103, arms-length contracts at the point the oil was sold, is not material to the Commission's decision on Summary
Judgment. The Respondent's contention that this is a disputed fact is not relevant to this proceeding.
-4-
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the Tax Commission.2
14.

On November 21, 2005, the Commission directed the Division to issue a severance tax refund

to Exxon Mobil in the amount of $2,168,334.87 plus statutory interest.
15.

On January 6, 2006, the Commission issued a refund check for $3,387,991.91 (the

$2,168,334.87 plus statutory interest) payable to ExxonMobil.
16.

Exxon Corporation had timely filed severance tax returns for the 1998 and 1999 tax years.

Exxon Corporation became ExxonMobil as a result of the 1999 merger.
17.

On or about May 24, 2005, ExxonMobil filed an amended 1998 severance tax return that

indicated Exxon Corporation had made an overpayment of $71,105 with its original return. ExxonMobil
alleged that the overpayment resulted from the fact the Exxon Corporation had not fully deducted
transportation costs or correctly asserted applicable oil stripper exemptions in the original severance tax
returns. By Statutory Notice dated May 31,2006, the Division denied most of the 1998 refund request relating
to the tax paid by Exxon Corporation. ExxonMobi 1 appealed the denial to the Utah State Tax Commission and
the appeal was designated as Appeal No, 06-0915.
18.

On or about May 24, 2005, ExxonMobil filed an amended 1999 severance tax return that

indicated Exxon Corporation had made an overpayment of $94,303. By Statutory Notice dated August 30,
2006, the Division informed ExxonMobil that the severance tax would be reduced by only $15,500.77.
ExxonMobil appealed the denial of the remainder of the refund to the Utah State Tax Commission and the
appeal was designated as Appeal No. 06-1218.
19.

For the tax year 1999, MEPNA had timely filed an annual return separately from the annual

2 Although the parties each argue that various portions of the Utah Supreme Court's decision support their positions,
the decision itself does not give rise to a dispute of fact. The decision provides legal guidance, appropriate for the
Commission to consider in making its determination on whether the Petitioners are entitled to judgment as a matter
-5-. ,-v -v .-v r\
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return filed by ExxonMobil MEPNA's annual return reported MEPNA's share of production from the
McElmo Creek Unit and the Ratherford Unit MEPNA's annual return did not report production owned by the
former Exxon Corporation.
20.

On or about May 22, 2006, MEPNA filed an amended 1999 severance tax return, which

indicated an overpayment of $285,842. The overpayment resulted from the fact that MEPNA had not fully
deducted transportation costs in its original severance tax return. On February 1,2007, the Division granted
MEPNA's 1999 refund request in its entirety.
21.

For the 2000 tax year, MEPNA had filed an annual return separately from the annual return

filed by ExxonMobil, reporting MEPNA 5s share of production from the McElmo Creek Unit and the
Ratherford Unit MEPN A^s annual return did not report production owned by the former Exxon Corporation.
22.

On or about February 28,2007, MEPNA filed an amended 2000 severance tax return, which

indicated an overpayment of S261,444. By Statutory Notice dated August 24, 2007, the Division informed
MEPNA that it denied the severance tax refund.3 MEPNA timely filed an appeal of the denial, and the appeal
is identified as Appeal No. 07-1118.
23.

ExxonMobil timely filed a severance tax return for the 2000 tax year, reporting its share of

production from wells in the McElmo Creek Unit separately from the production owned by MEPNA. The
share of production reported by ExxonMobil was based on Exxon Corporation's interest in production from
the McElmo Creek Unit prior to the Merger.
24.

On or about February 28, 2007, ExxonMobil filed an amended severance tax return for the

2000 tax year, which indicated an overpayment of $84,649. By Statutory Notice dated August 24,2007, the

of law.
3 The parties argue there are facts in dispute regarding why this and the subsequent refunds were denied. However.
the reason is not material to the Commission's decision in this matter.
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Division informed ExxonMobil that it had denied its severance tax refund request for the 2000 tax year.
ExxonMobil timely appealed the denial to the State Tax Commission and the appeal was identified as Appeal
No. 07-1124.
25.

ExxonMobilfiledtimely severance tax returns for the tax years 2001 through 2003. During

the first quarter of 2001, ExxonMobil's quarterly report did not include production owned by MEPNA from
the McEimo Creek Unit or any production from the Ratherford Unit. After the first quarter of 2001,
ExxonMobil combined the data, which had, prior to that time, been separately reported by MEPNA and the
former Exxon Corporation. Beginaing the second quarter of 2001 and continuing through 2003 ExxonMobil
filed annual returns reporting combined production from the McEimo Creek Unit and the Ratherford Unit in
which ExxonMobil or its wholly-owned subsidiary, MEPNA, had an interest.
26.

On or about February 28, 2007, ExxonMobil filed amended severance tax returns for the

2001, 2002 and 2003 tax years, which indicated overpayments of $359,689, 5400,155.83 and $372,568.62
respectively. ExxonMobil alleged that the overpayment resulted from the fact that ExxonMobil had not fully
deducted transportation costs in its original severance tax returns.
27.

By Statutory Notice dated August 24, 2007, the Division informed ExxonMobil that it had

denied its severence tax refund request for the 2001 through 2003 tax years. ExxonMobil timely appealed the
denial to the State Tax Commission and the appeal was identified as Appeal No. 07-1124,
ANALYSIS
In the Motion, Petitioners request that the Commission order Respondent to issue the refund
requests, arguing that they are entitled to retroactive relief pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
ExxonMobil Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2003 UT 53, 87 P.3d 706 (2003). The facts material
to whether the Petitioners in this matter are entitled to retroactive relief, as provided by the Supreme Court in

-7-
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ExxonMobil Corporation, are not in dispute. The Commission simply must interpret the Utah Supreme
Court's decision and the application of that decision to the subsequent refund requests filed by MEPNA and
ExxonMobil that are the subject of this proceeding. That the parties have differences in opinion regarding the
application of the decision to the undisputed facts, does not of itself constitute a dispute of fact.
From the undisputed facts, the Commission notes that although the Original Appeal involved
refund requests filed by ExxonMobil for taxes originally paid by MEPNA for multiple years (1993-1998), the
requests had been combined into one appeal, that being Appeal No. 00-0901. As it was ExxonMobil that filed
the refund requests subject to the Original Appeal, the Commission listed ExxonMobil as the Petitioner on the
appeal, rather than MEPNA. In its decision in the Original Appeal, the Commission denied the combined
refund request It was this denial that ExxonMobil had been appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and was the
subject of the Court's decision in ExxonMobil Corporation. Further, all the subsequent refund requests that
are now at issue in this proceeding, filed by either MEPNA or ExxonMobil, were filed at the Tax Commission
years after November 25,2003, when the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in ExxonMobil Corporation.
The Utah Supreme Court listed ExxonMobil Corporation as the Petitioner in its proceeding.
Id. at 706. The Court noted ExxonMobil Corporation filed the petition and then defined it as "ExxonMobil."
Id. at 707. In that decision the Court "reverse[d] the Tax Commission's determination that severance taxes
should be based on the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale5' and found that "[valuation must
occur in the immediate vicinity of the well . , ." Id. at 712. The Supreme Court remanded the matter back to
the Tax Commission for "further adjudication of [ExxonMobil's] claim for a refund . . ." Id. After further
adjudication, the Tax Commission ordered the Division to issue a refund to ExxonMobil in the amount of
$2,168,334.87 plus interest
However, the Court had limited its decision to prospective application for other severance
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taxpayers, stating in its conclusion, "Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending
before the Tax Commission, our holding is to apply prospectively only." Id. at 712. ExxonMobil argues in the
appeals currently before the Commission that it is entitled to the same retroactive application granted by the
Supreme Court in the Original Appeal for all the subsequent refund requests.
It is clear from the Court's decision in this matter that it was contemplating a specific refund
request, t\\t combined requests from the Original Appeal. The Court considered the combined refund requests
to be a single request for refund. The Court indicated the matter under review was the "Tax Commission []
decision upholding the denial of ExxonMobil's request for a refund . . ." Id. at 707. In the Factual
Background, the Court stated that the case involved "a refund of severance taxes . . . from January 1, 1993
through December 31, 1998." Id. at 707. The Court resolved the matter relating to the Tax Commission's
denial of "ExxonMobil's request for a refund." Id. at 708. See aho Id. at 709 ("the requested refund" and
"ExxonMobil's refund request"). The Commission notes there is no mention, or acknowledgment in the
Court's decision that ExxonMobil might subsequently file additional refund requests for later periods or
different subsidiaries than the "request for a refund" before the Court in that proceeding.
It is also clear from the express language of the Court that it intended to iim it the refunds that
would otherwise result from its decision because of the financial impact to governmental entities. The Court in
ExxonMobil Corporation explained, at Id. at 712, why it had applied its prospective effect doctrine to most
refunds, stating:
The revenue concerns cited by the Tax Commission and amici convince us that
application of our prospective effect doctrine is appropriate in this case. When
invalidating the actions of a taxing authority, we have long recognized that our
decisions may be given prospective effect to protect the solvency of governmental
entities and to avoid administrative and financial hardship caused by retroactive
application of rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities. See, e.g.,
-9-
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RioAlgomCorp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184,196 (Utah 1984). Werecognize,
however, that preventing the retroactive application of the rule to ExxonMobil, which
has expended considerable time and resources to attack the actions of the Tax
Commission, would both deprive ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory and
"potentially] , , , discourag[e] other litigants from challenging [actions] of
questionable validity " V-l Oil Co v Utah State Tax Comm % 942 P.2d 906, 914
(Utah 1996). (citing Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196.).) We give our holding this
selectively prospective application because we are convinced that retroactive
application could result in large refunds of taxes already collected and spent by
government entities. Although the full breadth and depth of the impact is not
immediately apparent from the record before us, no doubt it would be substantial and
involve funds already budgeted, collected, and spent. Large refunds of money
already collected and spent would pose a great burden on the amici revitalization
funds and other relatively small governmental entities operation on correspondingly
small budgets. Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all
but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application oniy.
The Court's analysis was driven by policy considerations, best met by interpreting the Court's
retroactive application narrowly to only include the "refund request" before the court in ExxonMobil
Corporation, The proposed interpretation of the Petitioners is not well supported by the Court's policy-driven
analysis because that interpretation greatly extends the Court's limited retroactive application to refund
requests unknown to the Court at the time of the decision. Using the facts before it, the Court weighed the
policy concerns of (1) protecting the revenue concerns of government entities, and (2) providing the litigant the
fruits of victory and not discouraging prospective litigants. In light of the Court's discussion, the Court likely
intended to broadly protect the small government entities from other refund requests not before it. Based on
the retroactive application of the Supreme Court's decision on the "refund request" that was at issue before the
Court, a refund check in the amount of $3,387,991.91 was issued to ExxonMobil, providing ExxonMobil the
fruits of victory.
Lastly, it is clear from the Court's conclusion in ExxonMobil Corporation, that although it
granted retroactive application of its decision to ExxonMobil, and not any other party, the retroactive
application granted was limited to the specific claim for refund before the Court during that proceeding. The
-10-
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Commission recognizes the Court's statement that "as to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to
have prospective application only" {Id. at 712) could, in isolation, be interpreted to allow other claims by
ExxonMobil However, considering the entirety of the decision the retroactive relief was limited to the refund
claim before the Court in that matter. The Court's conclusion, at Id, at 712, was not to grant ExxonMobil
retroactive relief for any and ail additional refund claims it may eventually file, but instead, specified that". .
. ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a refund, as to other parties who may have
refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our holding is
to apply prospectively only.'" The Court's reference to "its claim for a refund" indicates the retroactive reiief
was limited to the refund claim that was before it in that proceeding.
If the Court had intended a broader application of the selective retroactive relief it would have
been specific on that point. One of the cases the Court in ExxonMobil Corporation cited as precedent for the
selective retroactive application was Rio Algom Corp v. San Juan Comity, 681 P. 2d 184,196 (Utah 1984). In
Rio Algom the Court weighed the need to preserve the financial solvency of local governments against
discouraging challenges to statutes of questionable validly and concluded that retroactive application would
apply only to the stated plaintiffs in that case and only to the specific refund claim for which the suit was
brought The Court also applied a selective retroactive application of its decision in V-1 Oil Co. v Utah State
Tax Comm 'n, 942 P,2d 906 (Utah 1996). In that case V-1 requested injunctive relief on behalf of itself and all
similarly situated parties. The Court applied its decision prospectively as to all the other similarly situated
parties, but for V-1 the decision was applied "retroactive to the year in which V-1 alleges it began to pay the
surcharge, subject only to any applicable statutes of limitations and to the extent that V-1 can demonstrate that

4 In its Memorandum m Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Petitioner, at page v, prg. 16, characterized
the Supreme Court's decision to be one that, according to Petitioner, "granted ExxonMobil's requests for severance
tax refunds/' (Emphasis added.) The Commission finds this misleading as the Court always referred only to a single
-11-
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it paid the surcharge..." Id. at 915. In both of those cases the Court fashioned the selective retroactive relief
in a manner it found appropriate based on the facts and circumstances before it. Therefore, there is no reason
for the Commission to conclude that when the Court in ExxonMobil Corporation stated that ExxonMobil was
entitled to "further adjudication of its claim for a refund" it meant something other than the specific refund
claim that was before it in the matterIt is the conclusion of the Tax Commission that ExxonMobil is not entitled to the retroactive
application of the Court's decision in ExxonMobil Corporation to the refund requests at issue in these appeals
that are now before the Commission. Therefore, ExxonMobil is not entitled as a matter of law to the Summary
Judgment requested.
ORDER
Based upon the forgoing, Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. It is so
ordered.
DATED this

/7

day of A^HZ-^-g^^

2008.

C^ijus^r^—
Jaae Phan
Administrative Law Judge

request or single claim for a refund from ExxonMobile.
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision
DATED this

/ 7

day of

(^fa^

^

^%2\
Pam Hendnckson
Commission (than

Marc B
Commisspofier
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' \ H P A R Bruce Johnson
Commissioner
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DISSENT
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues I interpret ExxonMobil Corporation v C/ra/7 S/a/e
Tax Commission (Utah 2003) differently and as such hold Petitioners are entitled to summary judgment for
retroactive lehef
Retroactive relief does apply to Petitioners for all the years in question m this ordei The Utah
Supreme Court expected administrative remedy and the application of its ruling to the parties at issue ExxonMobil and its wholly owned subsidiary, Mobil Exploration and Producing North American (MEPNA) the Petitioneis ExxonMobil and MEPNA are not the "other parties,' referied to m ExxonMobil, but the
claimants to whom "the fruits of victory" wereawaided "whether in refund requests or deficiency pioceedings5"
as the Utah Supreme Court wiote in ExxonMobil
The Majority has chosen a narrow reading of ExxonMobil The Majonty supports its narrow
reading of ExxonMobil citing what they hold to be the Court's "policy considerations5* and "policy-driven
analysis " They use this to say, "the Court hkely intended to broadly protect the small government entities
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from other refund requests not before it." To support this position, the Majority relies on Rio Algom Corp. v
San Juan Count)' (Utah 1984) and V-l Oil Company v. Utah State Tax Commission and the Utah State
Department of Environmental Quality (Utah 1996) claiming 'the Court fashioned selective retroactive relief in
a maimer it found appropriate based on the facts and circumstances before it."
The Majority attempts to use RioAlgom to support its narrow reading of ExxonMobil and its
interpretation that "its claim for a refund " is the claim before the Court. The Majority wrote, "However,
considering the entirety of the decision the retroactive relief was limited to the refund claim before the Court in
that matter. . .. The Court's reference to s its claim for a refund' indicates the retroactive relief was limited to
the refund claim that was before it in that proceeding."
The Majority fails to provide an analysis as to why a strict reading of RioAlgom applies to this
matter. The Majority's narrow reading of the five words "its claim for a refund" actually does a disservice to
the desire of the Court, which was to not deprive the claimants the fruits of victory whether in refund requests
or deficiency proceedings. In addition, the Majority does not offer an analysis of what ExxonMobil means in
its entirety. The Court has not delineated in their decisions what the circumstances are for a claimant to be
afforded a refund for a year, to a year or for all years forward.
The Court could have specifically limited ExxonMobil to the years before it as it did in Rio
Algorn, The Court did not; thus, there is nothing in the ExxonMobil decision to indicate relief for the Petitioner
is limited to the years that were before the Court.
The Majority also cites V-l to support its position of selective and limited retrospective
application. In that case the Court penned the following:
Prospective application of our decision to V-l, the only party' to this appeal, would
have the potential of discouraging other litigants from challenging statutes of
questionable validity. RioAlgom,681 P.2dall96, Indeed, we have said in the past
that it would be unconscionable to deprive the litigant who has sustained the burden
-14-
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of attacking an unconstitutional statute of the fruits of victory Salt Lake City v
Ohms, 881 P.2d 884, 854-55 (Utah 1994); see also Latrum v, Utah State Bd. of
Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 914 (Utah 1993). Therefore as to V-l our decision is
retroactive to the year in which V-l alleges it began to pay the surcharge,
subject only to any applicable statutes of limitations and to the extent that V-l
can demonstrate that it paid the surcharge on motor fuels. See Rio Algom 681
P.2d at 196. (Emphasis added)
In V-l, prospective application applied to other similarly situated parties, not [he claimant, V1. Furthermore V-l was afforded retroactive treatment to the year it could prove it paid the surcharge and
forward to the date of the issuance of the Court's decision.
There are two avenues for relief as outlined in the cases Rio Algom and V-l, In a reading of
all the cases, there is a different approach to each. The Majority has not explained why a Rio Algom analysis is
controlling in this matter. To use the Majority's words - "reading in its entirety" - the fact situation in
ExxonMobil is more similar to V-l.
In Rio Algom, the tax collected was a centrally assessed tax, distributed to local government
entities. In VL the tax was a surcharge collected by the State for a petroleum tank storage fund or general pool
in which large and small owners and operators participated. In ExxonMobil, a portion of the severance tax
collected was allocated to area specific revitalization funds, but the greater amount was credited to the general
fund for statewide purposes.
Although some separate entities benefit from the taxes paid by ExxonMobil, the
overwhelming amount goes to the State as a whole, thus the impact on small funds is less in the matter before
us than in Rio Algom. In V-l, the Court deemed the State could separately address the amount of funds needed
in the pool and replacement of funds to the pool rather than deprive the litigant the fruits of victory. As such,
in V-l the Court made their ruling retroactive to the year claimant V-l could show it began to pay the
surcharge.
-15-
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The factual scenarios in V-l and in ExxonMobil share common elements, all or most of the
monies collected were ultimately retained with the State; the State was better positioned (than smaller local
entities) to address changes to the funds and provide solutions to protect the solvency of the funds. Therefore,
the V-l analysis applies to ExxonMobil Using the V-l approach, claimant ExxonMobil is entitled to the
requested relief.
In ExxonMobil the Court wrote:
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to ail but
ExxonMobil, the rule announced today is to have prospective application
only. (Emphasis added)
Had it wanted, the Court could have specifically limited the retrospective relief as it did in Rio
Algom\ instead the Court more closely followed its actions in V-l • Until the Court chooses to clarify otherwise,
I hold a commonsense reading of ExxonMobil compels retroactive treatment to the year for which the suit for
the refund was brought and up to the issuance of the Court's decision.
Petitioners, ExxonMobil and MEPNA, filed amended severance tax returns because it
expected Respondent, the Auditing Division of the Sate Tax Commission to honor the 2003 Supreme Court
ExxonMobil ruling and address refund requests based on ExxonMobil. Petitioners properly pursued the
administrative remedy by filing amended returns believing correctly, ExxonMobil was applicable to them and
their amended returns. Unfortunately, Petitioners received mixed messages from Respondent
ExxonMobil Corporation filed amended returns for tax years 1998 and 1999 on May 19 and
May 24, 2005 respectively. For both years, partial refunds were granted to ExxonMobil.
MEPNA filed an amended return for 1999 on May 22,2006 - nine days before Respondent
issued a decision on ExxonMobil's 1998 amended return (issued May 31,2006) and more than 90 days before
Respondent issued a decision on ExxonMobil's 1999 amended return (issued August 30,2006). MEPNA's
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requested refund was granted in its entirety.
Respondent's actions would suggest that Petitioner's refund requests would be addressed
administratively by Respondent based on ExxonMobil Accordingly, Petitioners filed amended returns for tax
years 2000 - 2003 all on February 28. 2007, exactly 27 days after Respondent granted in whole the refund
based on MEPNA's 1999 amended returns Except tins time, five and half months later. Respondent denied
all the amended returns filed for tax years 2000-2003.
Why Petitioner chose to file its first amended returns 18 months after the ExxonMobil decision
instead of sooner eludes me, however, based on the Supreme Court decision, it is reasonable for Petitioner to
assume it could file amended returns for the years not part of its Supreme Court appeal, but up to the yeai
ExxonMobil was issued All tax years cannot be presented at one time, as taxes must be filed each year
Neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent would have known to value oil and gas "m the immediate vicinity of
the well with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state" for the purposes of applying the seveiance
tax until ExxonMobil was issued in "November 2003 Therefore, as there are no disputed issues of material
fact, Petitioners are entitled to summary judgment foi retroactive relief
1 understand gi anting a refund to an oil company may be unpopular in the cm rent
environment, however, the facts and legal precedent cannot compel a different outcome. Had my position been
the ruling of this body, the Governor and Legislature would have needed to be informed of the potential budget
impact, and it would have been my hope that Petitioners would have used any refund to continue to invest in
Utah's economy through infrastructure, jobs and a long-term presence in Utah. In the end, I am most wary
of the precedent the Majority opinion sets for subsequent taxpayers and entities seeking administrative
remedy and relief based on a court decision.
It is an often-cited principle to be cautious when interpreting tax statutes against taxpayers. As
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the Supreme Court wrote in County Board ofEqualization of Wasatch County v. Utah Stale Tax Commission
and Strawberry Water Users Association (Utah 1997)
It is an established rule in the construction of tax statutes that if any doubt exists as to
the meaning of the statute, "our practice is construe taxation statutes liberally in favor
of the taxpayer, ieaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if
such intent exists." Salt Lake County v. State Tax Commission 779 P .2d 1131,
1332 (Utah 1989).
If there is any ambiguity in the reading and application of retroactivity and prospectivity as it
relates to the Court's cases, I have applied that principle in favor of the taxpayer.

5

&Ch

D Arcy Dixon Pignanj
Commissioner

Notice: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for Reconsideration with the
Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 63G-4-302. A Request for Reconsideration must
allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for Reconsideration
with the Commission, this order constitutesfinalagency action. You have thirty (30) days after the date of this
order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Sec. 59-1-601 et seq, & 63G-4-401
et seq.
JKP/06-0915 sjcU
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ExxonMobil Corporation, Petitioner, v. Utah State Tax Commission, and State of
Utah, Respondents.
No. 20021023
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
2003 UT 53; 86 P.3d 706; 487 Utah Adv. Rep. 6; 2003 Utah LEXIS 131; 159 Oil &
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Rehearing denied by Exxonmobile v. Tax Comrru 2004
Utah LEXIS 48 (Utah. Jan. 20. 2004)
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CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner taxpayer filed a
petition for review of respondent tax commission's decision that severance taxes should have been based on the
value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale and upholding the denial of the taxpayer's request for a refund
of allegedly miscalculated severance taxes on certain oil
and gas interests.
OVERVIEW: The tax commission's general practice in
calculating the severance tax due on oil had been to base
the tax on the price of the oil at the actual point of sale.
The taxpayer argued that the statutory provisions regarding the severance tax required the valuation of the oil at
the well site, which was the point of removal from the
earth. The supreme court reversed the tax commission's
decision because (1) the statutory language of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 59-5-101, 59-5-103 was ambiguous; (2) there
was no indication that the legislature intended its use of
the word "production" in Utah Code Ann. § 59-5101(19) to be given any of the definitions suggested by
the parties; (3) given the ambiguity in the statute, the

supreme court was compelled to construe a taxation statute liberally in favor of the taxpayer; and (4) the oil and
gas severance tax valuation should not have occurred at
the point of sale, but rather in the immediate vicinity of
the point at which the oil or gas was physically removed
from the earth; however, to qualify as the point at which
production was complete, that point had to have been
one at which sales of the oil and gas actually occurred.
OUTCOME: The tax commission's determination was
reversed. Although the taxpayer was entitled to further
adjudication of its claim for a refund, as to other parties
who may have had refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the tax commission, this holding was to apply prospectively only.
CORE TERMS: oil, valuation, tank, separator, refund,
earth, severance taxes, emulsion, removal, arm's-length,
immediate vicinity, statutory provisions, severance, netback, prospective application, impurities, valve, purchase
price, statutory language, governmental entities, extraction, collected, taxation, tax statutes, retroactive application, transportation, calculating, correctness, convinced,
compelled
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Energy & Utilities Law > Taxation
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Natural Resources
Tax > Imposition of Tax

Page 1

2003 UT 53, *; 86 P.3d 706, **;
487 Utah Adv. Rep. 6; 2003 Utah LEXIS 131,***

Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Sales Tax > Imposition of Tax
IHNljThe statutory provisions require that a severance
tax be computed based on the value, at the well, of the
oil or gas, which is defined as the value of oil or gas at
Ihe point production is completed. Utah Code Ann, §§
59-5-102(l)(a\ 59-5-101(19) (2000).

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Jurisdiction >
State Court Review
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Administration &
Proceedings > Judicial Review
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Natural Resources
Tax > Imposition of Tax
[HN2]Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (2002) a
party may petition the Utah Supreme Court for review of
a tax commission's decision.

Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of
Review > De Novo Review
Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of
Review > Statutory Interpretation
Tax Law > State <£ Local Taxes > General Overview
[HN3]As questions of law, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the tax commission's interpretations of the various
statutory provisions for correctness, according the tax
commission's interpretations no deference.

Energy & Utilities Law > Transportation & Pipelines >
General Overview
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Natural Resources
Tax > General Overview
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Sales Tax > General
Overview
[HN4]Each person owning an interest in oil or gas produced from a well in Utah, or in the proceeds of the production, shall pay to Utah a severance tax equal to four
percent of the value, at the well, of the oil or gas produced, saved, and sold or transported from the field
where the substance is produced. Utah Code Ann. § 595-102(1 V a) (2000).

Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Natural Resources
Tax > General Overview
[HN5]See Utah Code Ann. $ 59-5-101(19).

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
[HN6]When the Utah Supreme Court interprets a statute,
it looks first to the plain language. In doing so, it gives

all statutory provisions relevance and meaning independent of other provisions.

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
[HN7]In the context of statutory interpretation, if the
Utah Supreme Court finds ambiguity in a statute's language, it looks to legislative history and other policy
considerations for guidance.

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > General Overview
[HN8]In the context of an interpretation of a taxation
statute, the Utah Supreme Court's evaluation of ambiguous language requires it to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists.

Energy & Utilities Law > Purchase Contracts > General Overview
Energy & Utilities Law > Taxation
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Natural Resources
Tax > Imposition of Tax
[HN9] Utah Code Ann. $ 59-5-103(1) (2000) establishes
the methods for computing the value of oil or gas for
severance tax purposes. It provides that the value is to be
established under an arm's-length contract for the purchase of production at the well.
Energy & Utilities Law > Purchase Contracts > General Overview
Energy & Utilities Law > Refining & Processing >
General Overview
Energy & Utilities Law > Transportation & Pipelines >
General Overview
[HN10]In the absence of an arm's-length contract, Utah
Code Ann, g 59-5-103(l)(a) (2000) provides that other
methods may be employed in descending order to determine value for severance tax purposes. First, value may
be ascertained by reference to a non-arm's-length contract if it is equivalent to the value received under comparable arm's-length contracts for purchases or sales of
like-quality oil or gas in the same field. The next method
of valuation allowable under Utah Code Ann. S 59-5103(l)(b) allows one to determine value by consideration
of information relevant in valuing like-quality oil or gas
at the well in the same field or nearby fields or areas
such as: posted prices, prices received in arm's-length
spot sales, or other reliable public sources of price or
market information. The final method, allowed if no
other method is applicable, is the net-back method,
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which allows a producer to determine the value of the oil
or gas by deducting costs of transporting and processing
from the eventual sales or market price, up to 50 percent
of the value of the oil or gas. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5103flVc\ 59-5-101(7).

Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Natural Resources
Tax > General Overview
[HNll]The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the
statutory language in Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-101, 59-5102 must give meaning and relevance to each of the
valuation methods.

Energy & Utilities Law > Taxation
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Natural Resources
Tax > General Overview
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Sales Tax > Definitions
[HN12]The statutory definition of "well" notes that a
well is an extractive means. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5101(20) (2000). This seems to indicate physical extraction from the earth, not the extraction of oil or gas from
other impurities further down the line.

Energy <& Utilities Law > Taxation
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Natural Resources
Tax > Definitions
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Sales Tax > General
Overview
[HN13]In the context of the oil and gas severance tax,
the Utah Supreme Court holds that valuation does not
necessarily occur at the point of sale, wherever that may
be, but rather in the immediate vicinity of the point at
which the oil or gas is physically removed from the
earth. However, to qualify as the point at which production is complete, that point must be one at which sales of
the oil and gas may actually occur. "At the well," where
"production is complete," read in light of the language
favoring valuation by reference to an arm's-length contract price but allowing other methods, including the netback method, contemplates valuation in the immediate
vicinity of the point of removal from the earth.

Governments > Courts > Authority to Adjudicate
Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents
[HN14]When invalidating the actions of a taxing authority, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes that its decisions
may be given prospective effect to protect the solvency
of governmental entities and to avoid administrative and
financial hardship caused by retroactive application of
rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities.

Energy & Utilities Law > Taxation
Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents
Tax Law > State & Local Taxes > Natural Resources
Tax > General Overview
[HN15]The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that preventing the retroactive application of the rule to a plaintiff which expends considerable time and resources to
attack the actions of the tax commission, would both
deprive a plaintiff of the fruits of victory and potentially
discourage other litigants from challenging actions of
questionable validity.
COUNSEL: David J. Crapo, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Clark L. Snelson, Asst.
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Mark K. Buchi, Steven P. Young, Salt Lake City, for
amici ConocoPhillips Company, ChevronTexaco Exploration and Production Company,
Thomas W. Clawson, Salt Lake City, for amicus Union
Oil Company of California.
Philip C. Pugsiey, Asst Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for
amici Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund, Navajo Revitalization Fund.
Steven F. Alder, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for
amicus Utah Division of Oil, Gas, & Mining.
Bill Thomas Peters, David W. Scofield, Salt Lake City,
for amicus Utah Association of Counties.
JUDGES: WILKINS, Justice. Chief Justice Durham,
Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Wilkins' opinion.
OPINION BY: WILKINS
OPINION
[**707] WILKINS, Justice:
[*P1] ExxonMobil Corporation ("ExxonMobil")
filed a petition for review of a Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") decision upholding the denial
of ExxonMobil's [* **2] request for a refund of allegedly
miscalculated severance taxes on certain oil and gas interests. We reverse.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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[*P2] The essential facts of this case are not in dispute. ExxonMobil requested a refund of severance taxes
it believes it overpaid from January 1, 1993 through December 31, 1998. During that period, ExxonMobil operated numerous oil and gas wells in southeastern Utah that
were subject to the severance tax imposed by Utah Code
Ann, sections 59-5-101 through-119 (2000).
[*P3] ExxonMobil's operation of the wells involves
removing the oil and gas from the earth at the mouth of
the well. At that point, the oil and gas is in an emulsion
form, mixed with impurities such as water and sand. The
impurities in the emulsion are commonly known as basic
sediment and water ("BS&W"). At the point of removal
[**708] from the earth, the entire emulsion is often referred to as total production and is conveyed from the
mouth of the well, through a valve structure, and usually
into a separator tank or through pipelines for additional
refining. The emulsion "is almost never sold directly
from the [valve structure]." Selling oil and [***3] gas
from the valve structure could be done, however, if some
sort of portable testing device were brought to the site to
measure volumes. Separator tanks are generally located
in the immediate vicinity of the mouth of the well and
allow the components of the emulsion to separate so that
much of the BS&W is removed from the oil and gas. It
appears from the record that any gas is generally separated from the rest of the emulsion at this point, while the
oil and the remainder of the emulsion are transported
together. Sometimes oil and gas are sold at this point,
having been separated to some degree from the BS&W
and readied for transport to other facilities.
[*P4] When the oil is not sold from a separator
tank, the remaining emulsion is transported to a satellite
facility that further treats the emulsion for sale. Much
like at a separator tank, sales also occur at this point, but
operators often elect instead to transfer the oil to a tank
battery facility where it is further treated and then metered at a Lease Automatic Custody Transfer ("LACT")
meter and loaded onto trucks or into pipelines. Though
other entities do so, during the time period in question
ExxonMobil rarely sold [***4] its oil directly from
separator tanks in the immediate vicinity of the well,
instead transporting most of the oil to other facilities.
When purchases were made in the well's vicinity, the
purchase price was adjusted downward to account for the
remaining impurities and transportation costs, among
other things. In one transaction, the price paid by the
purchaser was reduced from a posted price of $ 12.79 per
barrel to $ 9.29 per barrel.
[*P5] The Tax Commission's general practice in
calculating the severance tax due on oil has apparently
been to base the tax on the price of the oil at the actual
point of sale. Thus, oil sold from the separator tank, with
its price adjusted downward, would be taxed at a per-

centage of that lower price, whereas oil sold from the
battery facility would be taxed at the same rate, but on a
higher purchase price.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
P6 The Auditing Division of the Tax Commission
("Auditing Division") denied ExxonMobil's request for a
refund of severance taxes ExxonMobil believed it had
overpaid. ExxonMobil appealed that decision to the Tax
Commission, which bifurcated the factual issues of what
amount of tax was due and paid from the [***5] legal
issue of the appropriate point for calculating the tax. The
Tax Commission held a formal hearing on the second
issue.
[*P7] ExxonMobil argued that the statutory provisions regarding the severance tax required the Auditing
Division to value the oil at the well site, which is the
point of removal from the earth. The Auditing Division
argued that valuation should occur at the point of actual
sale. [HNl]The relevant statutory provisions require that
the tax be computed based on "the value, at the well, of
the oil or gas," which is defined as "the value of oil or
gas at the point production is completed." Utah Code
Ann. §§ 59-5-102(lXa), -101(19) (2000). The Tax
Commission's decision was split with two of four commissioners agreeing with the Auditing Division that
valuation should occur at the point of sale, which it
equated with completed production. One commissioner
agreed with ExxonMobil that valuation should occur at
the point of removal but gave that interpretation prospective application only. The fourth commissioner also
agreed that ExxonMobil's interpretation was correct,
without the prospective application limitation. Thus, the
Tax Commission [***6] denied ExxonMobil's request
for a refund. ExxonMobil requested reconsideration of
the decision, which was granted.
[*P8] Upon reconsideration by the Tax Commission, two commissioners remained convinced of the correctness of the Auditing Division's position, while the
other two commissioners remained convinced of the correctness of ExxonMobil's position. As to the prospective
application of the rule, two commissioners now agreed
that ExxonMobil should be entitled to relief. The Tax
Commission [**709] held, based on the tie vote between the four commissioners, that the Auditing Division
prevailed and value would be measured at the point of
sale for purposes of determining whether ExxonMobil
was entitled to the requested refund. Because ExxonMobil's refund request depended upon valuation at the point
of removal, summary judgment was entered against
ExxonMobil. [HN2]Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section
78-2-2 (2002), ExxonMobil petitioned this court for review of the Tax Commission's decision.
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[*P9] On appeal, ExxonMobil argues that the Tax
Commission erred by concluding that ExxonMobil was
not the prevailing party. ExxonMobil contends that allowing the use of the [***7] Auditing Division's interpretation of the method for calculating the severance tax
allows the Commission to impose a tax despite the statutory mandate that the Tax Commission act only with a
quorum of three agreeing. Utah Code Ann. ? 59-1-205
(2000). Further, ExxonMobil argues that the Commission erred by declaring the Auditing Division the prevailing party despite the tie vote because there is a statutory
presumption against taxation that cannot be overcome
without a majority vote. Lastly, ExxonMobil argues that
the Tax Commission's interpretation of the statutory language in question was in error. Because we resolve this
matter by statutory interpretation, we need not consider
ExxonMobil's arguments regarding the failure of three
members of the Tax Commission to agree on an interpretation.
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P10] [HN3]As questions of law, we review the
Tax Commission's interpretations of the various statutory
provisions implicated in this matter for correctness, according the Tax Commission's interpretations no deference. Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002
UT112.P14,61P.3dl053.
II. [***8] INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
[*P11] Two particular statutes require our review.
Both address valuation, providing:
[HN4]Each person owning an interest . . . in oil or
gas produced from a well in the state, or in the proceeds
of the production, shall pay to the state a severance tax
equal to 4% of the value, at the well, of the oil or gas
produced, saved, and sold or transported from the field
where the substance was produced.
Utah Code Ann. $ 59-5-102(T)(a) (2000).
[HN5]"'Value at the well' means the value of oil or gas at
the point production is completed." Id § 59-5-101(19).
These two provisions form the crux of the dispute now
before us.
[*P12] ExxonMobil contends that the severance tax
is to be calculated based on the value of the oil or gas at
the point at which it is removed from the earth. It argues
that although the value of its interest at the well is further
defined as the point of completed production, the terms
"production" and "extraction" are used synonymously
and render extraction as the appropriate measure. Id. £
59-5-101(20). Read in light of section 59-5-103, which
establishes methods of valuation, including [***9] the

net-back method in which the costs of post-extraction
transportation and processing are deducted from the ultimate purchase price, id § 59-5-101(7), ExxonMobil
argues that its interpretation is compelled by the severance tax statutes.
[*P13] The Tax Commission counters that the
statutory requirement that production be completed prior
to valuation of the oil or gas necessarily implies some
post-extraction alteration. Also citing the valuation
section, 59-5-103, the Tax Commission argues that the
clear statutory preference for valuation by reference to an
arm's-length contract supports its view that measuring
the value of the oil and gas at the point at which it is removed from the earth is inappropriate given the dearth of
sales that occur at the immediate point of removal.
Rather, the Tax Commission suggests that, in the simplest of situations, sales occur after at least some of the
BS&W is removed from the emulsion by storage in the
separator tank. Thus, the argument goes, the clear preference for valuing the oil or gas by utilizing an arm'slength contract price would be ill-served by a statutory
scheme set up to determine value at a [**710] point
where such arm's-length [***10] sales rarely occur.
[*P14] [HN6]When we interpret a statute, we look
first to the plain language. In re Worthed 926 P.2d 853,
866 (Utah 1996). In doing so, we give all statutory provisions relevance and meaning independent of other provisions. Id. [HN7]If we find ambiguity in the statute's language, we look to legislative history and other policy
considerations for guidance. Id. [HN8]In the context of a
taxation statute, our evaluation of ambiguous language
also requires us to '"construe taxation statutes liberally in
favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists.'"
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373-74 (Utah 1997)
(quoting Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n, 779
P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989)). The statutory language in
question in this case is not plain and we must resort to
policy considerations and our mandate that taxing statutes be construed in favor of the taxpayer.' Id.
1 We are not aware of, and the parties have not
cited, any relevant legislative history that would
inform our interpretation of the statutory provisions in question.
[***H] [*P15] Although both ExxonMobil and
the Tax Commission make reasonable arguments supporting their respective interpretations of the point of
valuation of oil and gas for severance tax purposes, neither party's position completely reconciles with the
valuation provisions of the severance tax statutes.
Section 59-5-103 [HN9]establishes the methods for
computing the value of oil or gas for severance tax purPage 5
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poses. It provides that the value is to be "established under an arm's-length contract for the purchase of production at the well." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103(1) (2000).
[HN10]In the absence of an arm's-length contract,
section 59-5-103 provides that other methods may be
employed in descending order to determine value. First,
value may be ascertained by reference to a non-arm'slength contract if it "is equivalent to the value received
under comparable arm's-length contracts for purchases or
sales of like-quality oil or gas in the same field." Id. §
59-5-103(l)(a). The next method of valuation allowable
under section 59-5-103 allows one to determine value
"by consideration of information relevant in valuing likequality oil or gas at the well in the same field [*** 12] or
nearby fields or areas such as: posted prices, prices received in arm's-length spot sales, or other reliable public
sources of price or market information." Id. § 59-5103(l)(b). The final method, allowed if no other method
is applicable, is the net-back method, which allows a
producer to determine the value of the oil or gas by deducting costs of transporting and processing from the
eventual sales or market price, up to 50% of the value of
the oil or gas. Id S§ 59-5-103(n(c). -101(7). The legislature's preferences for valuing oil and gas are clear from
this statute. [HNll]Our interpretation of the statutory
language in sections 59-5-101 and -102 must give meaning and relevance to each of the valuation methods. In re
Worthed 926 ?.2d at 866.
[*P16] The Tax Commission reasonably concludes
that "production" supposes an alteration of the oil or gas
from its natural state. However, were we to accept the
Tax Commission's position, the net-back valuation
method would have no relevance—a result we do not
favor. Id. The Tax Commission's position could never
result in utilization of the net-back method because any
sale would necessarily be at the point of [***13] completed production, where the Tax Commission argues
that valuation must occur. Thus, the transportation and
refinement costs deducted under the net-back method
would never be deductible from a sale price, but would
merely represent added value taxed as part of the increased purchase price. Additionally, [HN12]the statutory definition of "well" notes that a well is an "extractive means." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20) (2000).
This seems to indicate physical extraction from the earth,
not the extraction of oil or gas from other impurities further down the line as the Tax Commission suggests.
[*P17] ExxonMobil's interpretation would require
us to slight the statute, albeit to a lesser degree. Its position is roughly that oil or gas should be valued at the
point of removal from the earth. This argument ignores
the clear legislative preference for valuation [**711] by
reference to actual contracts for sale, id § 59-5-103(1),
because, according to the Tax Commission's unchal-

lenged factual findings, sales rarely occur without at least
some separation in a separator tank or some further refinement.
[*P18] Both parties support their interpretations by
offering [***14] various definitions of "production"
from different dictionaries, cases from other courts, and
unrelated statutes. Neither the Tax Commission's position nor ExxonMobil's position is compelled by the language of the statute. Likewise, there is no indication that
the legislature intended its use of the word "production"
in section 59-5-101(19) to be given any of the definitions
suggested by the parties.
PI 9 Given the ambiguity in the statute, we are compelled
to consider the general principle that we "construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it
to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists." County Bd. of Equalization of
Wasatch County, 944 P.2d at 373-74 (internal quotations
omitted). Applying this standard, [HN13]we hold that
valuation does not necessarily occur at the point of sale,
wherever that may be, but rather in the immediate vicinity of the point at which the oil or gas is physically removed from the earth. However, to qualify as the point at
which production is complete, that point must be one at
which sales of the oil and gas may actually occur.
[*P20] "At the well," where "production [***15]
is complete," read in light of the language favoring
valuation by reference to an arm's-length contract price
but allowing other methods, including the net-back
method, contemplates valuation in the immediate vicinity
of the point of removal from the earth. The Tax Commission's position regarding the statutory meaning is incorrect because it relies heavily on one interpretation of the
phrase "production is completed" instead of harmonizing
the various definitions at play in the severance tax statute. Accepting the Tax Commission's position would
lead to a widely disparate tax, based not on the value of
oil or gas actually removed from the ground and thus
taken from the state's pool of natural resources, but based
on the sales and marketing strategies of the various interest holders. A producer with testing facilities on site
could sell directly from the well's valve structure and pay
a much smaller tax than one who removes impurities or
otherwise refines the oil to sell at the battery facility. The
language of the statute contemplates calculation within
the immediate vicinity of the point of removal from the
earth, but it also compels calculation at some point where
sales are not a [***16] distinct rarity.
[*P21] The nature of the industry is such that sales
rarely, if ever, occur directly from the valve structure,
which appears to be the point of valuation advocated by
ExxonMobil. The statute, however, assumes a market for
oil and gas at the point of valuation. Thus, although we
Page 6
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hold that valuation is to occur in the immediate vicinity
of the point of removal, it need not necessarily occur at
the point of physical removal from the earth. There appears to be a market for oil and gas taken from the separator tanks near the well head. The Tax Commission so
found, although it apparently believed the failure of
ExxonMobil to sell much of its oil and gas at that point
was fatal to its claim for valuation there. This was error.
Valuation of the oil and gas at the separator tank allows
valuation to occur while the oil and gas are in a relatively
raw state, at the earliest possible, yet practicable, point of
sale. Where no separator tank is used, valuation may still
occur by reference to the value of similar oil at separator
tanks in the same field. This valuation system allows the
use of the preferences outlined in section 59-5-103,
unlike the methods proposed by [***17] either of the
parties.
[*P22] The Tax Commission and amici believe an
interpretation other than that adopted by the Tax Commission would drain state revenues at a time when revenue is relatively scarce. We are not blind to the impact of
our holding on the amount of taxes collected and distributed to various governmental entities, but any concerns
we have with the reduction of revenue are not properly
assuaged by an ends-based statutory interpretation. If the
legislature established the severance tax scheme to realize a specific revenue target and our interpretation of its
statutory language does not provide that level [**712]
of revenue, the legislature may amend the relevant statutes to provide for a different calculation of the tax that
will achieve the desired revenue.
III. APPLICATION OF OUR DECISION
[*P23] The revenue concerns cited by the Tax
Commission and amici convince us that application of
our prospective effect doctrine is appropriate in this case.
[HN14]When invalidating the actions of a taxing authority, we have long recognized that our decisions may be
given prospective effect to protect the solvency of governmental entities and to avoid administrative and financial [***18] hardship caused by retroactive application

of rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities. See, e.g., Rio Alzom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681
P.2d 184, 196 (Utah 1984). [HN15]We recognize, however, that preventing the retroactive application of the
rule to ExxonMobil, which has expended considerable
time and resources to attack the actions of the Tax
Commission, would both deprive ExxonMobil of the
fruits of victory and "potentially . . . discourage other
litigants from challenging [actions] of questionable validity." V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 942 P.2d
906, 914 (Utah 1996) (citing Rio Alzom. 681 P.2d at
196), vacated on other grounds, 942 P.2d 915 (Utah
1997). We give our holding this selectively prospective
application because we are convinced that retroactive
application could result in large refunds of taxes already
collected and spent by governmental entities. Although
the full breadth and depth of the impact is not immediately apparent from the record before us, no doubt it
would be substantial and involve funds already budgeted,
collected, and spent. Large refunds of money already
[***19] collected and spent would pose a great burden
on the amici revitalization funds and other relatively
small governmental entities operating on correspondingly small budgets. Thus, whether in refund requests or
deficiency proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil the rule
announced today is to have prospective application only.
CONCLUSION
[*P24] We reverse the Tax Commission's determination that severance taxes should be based on the value
of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale. Valuation
must occur in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the
oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state. Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of
its claim for a refund, as to other parties who may have
refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our holding is
to apply prospectively only. Reversed.
[*P25] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur
in Justice Wilkins' opinion.
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REVENUE AND TAXATION

under its official seal, directed to the sheriff of any county of
the state commanding the bheriff tu levy upon and sell the
real and personal property of the taxpayer found within the
county for the payment of the amount due, with the added
penalties interest and the cost of executing the warrant, and
to return the warrant to the commission and pay to it the
mone}^ collected within a specified time but not more than 60
days from the date of the warrant
1988
59-5-113. Collection by warrant — Effect of warrant.
(1) Immediately upon receipt of the w a r r a n t m duplicate,
the sheriff shall file the duplicate with the clerk of the district
court in that county The clerk shall enter in the -judgment
docket, in the column for judgment debtors, (a) the name of the
delinquent taxpayer mentioned in the warrant, and (bj in
appropriate columns, the amount of the tax or portion of it and
penalties for which the warrant is issued and the date when
the duplicate is filed The amount of the w a r r a n t so docketed
has the force and effect of an execution against all personal
property of the delinquent taxpayer, and also is a h e n upon the
real property of the taxpayer against whom it is issued in the
same manner as a judgment duly rendered by any district
court and docketed in the office of the clerk
(2) The sheriff shall proceed in the same manner as is
prescribed by law in respect to executions issued against
property upon judgments of a court of record, and is entitled to
the same fees for services in executing the w a r r a n t
1988
59-5-114 Limitation of actions.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (l)(c) through (f),
the commission shall assess the amount of taxes imposed
under this part, and any penalties and interest, within SIL
years after a taxpayer files a r e t u r n
(b) Except as provided in Subsections (l)(c) through (f),
if the commission does not make an assessment under
Subsection (l)(a) within six years, the commission may
not commence a proceeding for the collection of the taxes
after the expiration of the six-year period
(c) Notwithstanding Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the
commission may make an assessment or commence a
proceeding to collect a tax a t any tune if a deficiency is due
to
(l) fraud, or
(u) failure to file a return
(d) Notwithstanding Subsections (l)(a) and (b), beginning on July 1, 1998, the commission may extend the
period to make an assessment or to commence a proceeding to collect the tax under this part if
(1) the six-year period under this Subsection (1)
has not expired, and
(u) the commission and the taxpayer sign a written agreement
(A) authorizing the extension, and
(Bj providing for the length of t h e extension
(e) If the commission delays an audit at the request of
a taxpayer, the commission may make an assessment as
provided in Subsection (l)(f) if
(l) the taxpayer subsequently refuses to agree to
an extension request by the commission, and
(u) the six-year period under this Subsection (1)
expires before the commission completes the audit
(f) An assessment under Subsection (l)(e) shall be
d) for the time period for which the commission
could not make an assessment because of the expiration of the six-year period, and
(n) in an amount equal to t h e difference between
(A) the commission's estimate of t h e amount of
taxes the taxpayer would have been assessed for
the tune period descnoed in Subsection (l)(f)(i),
and
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(B) the amount of taxes the taxpayer actually
paid fo^ tne time ppn or) described in Subsection
(l)(f)(i)
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2Kb), the commission may not make a credit or refund unless the taxpayer
files a claim with the commission within six years of the
date of overpayment
(bj Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), begmning on
July 1, 1998, t h e commission shall extend the period for a
taxpayer to file a claim under Subsection (2)(a) if
d) the six-vear period under Subsection (2)(a) has
not expired, and
(u) the commission and the taxpayer sign a written agreement
(A) authorizing the extension, and
(B) providing for t h e length of the extension
1998

59-5-115.

Disposition of t a x e s collected — Credit to
General Fund.
All taxes imposed and collected under Section 59-5-102 shall
be paid to the commission, promptly remitted to the state
treasurer, and except those taxes otherwise allocated under
Section 51-9-305, 59-5-136, or 59-5-119, credited to the General Fund
2008
59-5-116. D i s p o s i t i o n of certain taxes collected on Ute
I n d i a n land.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), there shall be
deposited mto the Umtah Basm Revitahzation Fund established in Section 9-10-102
(a) for taxes imposed under this part, 33% of the taxes
collected on oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances
produced from a well
(I) for which production began on or before June
30 1995, and
(n) attributable to interests
(A) neld m trust by the United States for the
Tribe and its members, or
(B) on lands identified m Pub L No 440, 62
Stat 72(1948),
(b) for taxes imposed under this part, 80% of taxes
collected on oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances
produced from a well
(lj for which production began on or after July 1,
1995, and
Ui) attributable to interests
(A) held in trust by the Umted States for the
Tribe and its members or
(B) on lands identified in Pub L No 440, 62
Stat 72 (1948), and
(c) for taxes imposed under this part, 80% of taxes
collected on oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances
produced from a well
(l) for which production began on or after January
1, 2001 and
(n) attributable to interests on lands conveyed to
the tribe under the Ute-Moab Land Restoration Act,
Pub L No 106-398, Sec 3303
(2) ta) The maximum amount deposited m the Umtah
Basm Revitahzation Fund ma3' not exceed
d) $3,000,000 in fiscal year 2005-06
(n) $5,000 000 <m fiscal year 2006-07,
(in) $6,000,000 in fiscal years 2007-08 and 200809 and
dv) for fiscal vears beginning with fiscal year 200910, the amount determined by the commission as
described in Subsection (2)(b)
(b) d) The commission shall increase or decrease t h e
dollar amount described in Subsection (2)(a)(m) by a
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percentage equal to the percentage difference between the consumer price index for the preceding
calendar year and the consumer price index for calendar year 2007-08; and
(ii) after making an increase or decrease under
Subsection (2)(b)(i), round t h e dollar amount to the
nearest whole dollar.
(c) For purposes of this Subsection (2), "consumer price
index'* is as described in Section 1(f)(4), I n t e r n a l Revenue
Code, and defined in Section (l)(f )(5), Internal Revenue
Code.
(d) Any amounts in excess of t h e maximum described
in Subsection (2)(a) shall be deposited into the General
Fund.
2007
59-5-117, 59-5-118.

Repealed.

1988

59-5-119.

Disposition of certain t a x e s c o l l e c t e d on Navajo Nation Land l o c a t e d i n Utah..
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), there shall be
deposited into the Navajo Revitaiization F u n d established in
Section 9-11-104 for taxes imposed under t h i s p a r t beginning
on J u l y 1, 1997:
(a) 33% of the taxes collected on oil, gas, or other
hydrocarbon substances produced from a well:
(i) for which production began on or before J u n e
30,1996; and
(ii) attributable to interests in U t a h held in trust
by th& United States IQT -the Nrofey* Naftoa a n d i t s
members; and
(b) 80%. of the taxes collected on oil, gas, or other
hydrocarbon substances produced from a well:
(i) for which production began on or after July 1,
1996; and
(ii) attributable to interests in U t a h held in trust
by the United States for the Navajo Nation and its
members.
(2) (a) The maximum amount deposited in the Navajo
Revitaiization Fund may not exceed:
(i) $2,000,000 in fiscal year 2006-07; and
(ii) $3,000,000 for fiscal years beginning with fiscal
year 2007-08.
(b) Any amounts in excess of t h e m a x i m u m described
in Subsection (2)(a) shall be deposited into the General
Fund.
2007
59-5-120. E x e m p t i o n .
Beginiihig on January 1, 2006 and ending on J u n e 30, 2016,
no severance tax required by this chapter is imposed on oil and
gas produced, saved, sold, or transported if the oil or gas
produced, saved, sold, or transported is derived from:
(1) coal-to-liquids technology;
(2) oil shale; or
(3) tar sands.
zooe
PART 2
MINING SEVERANCE TAX
59-5-201. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) (a) "Metalliferous minerals" includes any ore,
metal,'or other substance containing t h e following:
(i) aluminum;
(ii) antimonj 7 ;
(hi) arsenic;
(iv) barium;
(v) beryllium:
(vi) bismuth;
(vii) boron;
(viii) cadmium;
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(ix) calcium;
ix) cerium;
(xi) cesium;
(xii) chromium;
(xiii) cobalt;
(xiv) columhium;
(xv) copper;
(xvi) gallium;
(xvii) germanium;
(xviii) gold;
(xix) hafnium;
(xx) indium;
(xxi) iridium;
(xxii) iron;
(xxiii) lanthanum;(xxiv) lead;
(xxv) lithium;
(xxvi) manganese;
(xxvii) mercury;
(xxviii) molybdenum;
(xxix) nickel;
(xxx) osmium;
(xxxi) palladium;
(xxxii) platinum;
(xxxiii) praseodymium;
(xxxiv) r a r e earth metals;
(xxxv) rhenium;
(xxxvi) rhodium;
(xxxvii) rubidium;
(xxxviii) ruthenium;
(xxxix) samarium;
(xl) scandium;
(xli) selenium;
(xlii) silicon;
(xliii) silver;
(xliv) sodium;
(xlv) strontium;
(xlvi) tantalum;
(xlvii) telmrium;
(xlviii) thallium;
(xlix) thorium;
(1) -tin;
(li) titanium;
(lii) tungsten;
(liii) uranium;
(liv) vanadium;
(lv) yttrium;
(lvi) zinc; or
(Ivii) zirconium,
(b) "Metalliferous minerals*' does not include:
(i) chloride compounds or salts;
(ii) potash;
(iii) rock, sand, gravel, and stone products;
(iv) gypsum;
(v) sulfur or sulfuric acid;
(vi) gem stones;
(vii) ammonium, nitrate;
(viii) carbon dioxide;
(ix) oil, gas, coal, and all carboniferous materials; or
(x) phosphate.
(2) "Mine" means an operation for extracting minerals
and includes any deposit of valuable metalliferous minerals t h a t are being extracted from a natural deposit, or a
secondary source including tails, slag, waste dumps, or
other similar secondary source, whether in solution or
otherwise.
(3) "Mining" means t h e act,-process, or work of extracting minerals from their natural occurring environment or
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the Court's desire to "avoid administrative hardship . . . caused by retroactive application of
rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities" is unfounded as demonstrated by
facts in this case inasmuch as (a) the ExxonMobil decision did not announce a new rule of
law, and (b) the issuance of refunds causes no more administrative hardship than the
issuance of deficiency assessments.
The distinctions represented by this appeal are so significant that they "render the
prior decision [on prospective relief in ExxonMobil inapplicable." Munson, 2007 UT 91,
p. 20.
B.

The Facts of this Appeal Demonstrate That the Court Misapprehended
the Impact General Application of the ExxonMobil Decision Would
Have on the Solvency of "Amici Funds and Other Relatively Small
Governmental Entities ."
1.

Revitalization Funds do not benefit from Unocal's severance
taxes because Unocal's wells are not on Indian lands.

The ExxonMobil Court applied the prospective effect doctrine based on its "desire to
protect the solvency of governmental entities." 2003 UT 53 ^f 23. The only entities
specifically discussed in the ExxonMobil decision were the Revitalization Funds. However,
the Revitalization Funds only have an interest in severance taxes paid for production
from wells located on Indian lands. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-116 and 119.
The Navajo Nation is located in the southernmost part of San Juan County.
http://www.southeastutah.org/en/menu/110/. The Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund is
funded by severance taxes from wells on Ute Indian Land located in Duchesne and Uintah
Counties. Utah Code Ann. § 9-10-101 et seq. The wells for which ExxonMobil sought
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severance tax refunds were located on Navajo Nation lands in San Juan County. In contrast,
the Lisbon Field is located in the northeastern part of San Juan County and is comprised
entirely of federal and State of Utah leases. R. 12 at f 10, 665. The Lisbon Field is not
located on Indian lands, therefore, no portion of the severance taxes paid by Unocal is
remitted to the Amici Funds.
Under Utah law, severance tax payments for oil and gas produced from wells which
are not located on Indian lands do not impact revitalization funds. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 59-5-116 and 119. This crucial distinction was not acknowledged during the ExxonMobil
litigation. In fact, the potential impact on Revitalization Funds was never discussed until
after ExxonMobil had already filed its appellate brief and the issue was only addressed by the
Revitalization Funds. As a result "the issue did not benefit from the focus and refinement
afforded issues actually litigated in the lower courts." Munson, 2007 UT'91, p. 21.
Apparently unaware of the fact that severance taxes only impact the Revitalization Funds
when the wells were located on Indian trust lands., this Court, in its haste to protect the
solvency of the Revitalization Funds and "other [unnamed and unidentified] relatively small
governmental entities/' refused to apply the ExxonMobil decision to "other parties who may
have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax
Commission" regardless of whether or not those other parties operated on Indian trust lands.
ExxonMobil, ^ 24.
The Court's concern for the solvency of the Revitalization Funds also suggests that it
may not have been aware that the Revitalization Funds would not have been affected by any
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refund requests for periods prior to June 30,1996. The statutory provision requiring
deposits of severance taxes into the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund did not go into effect
until July 1, 1997 3 Thus, for 4 and Vz years of the six year period represented by
ExxonMobil's refund request, the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund had not received any
of ExxonMobil's severance tax overpayments 4
Clearly the decision to deprive Unocal and other severance taxpayers whose wells
were not on Indian lands of the nght to rely on ExxonMobil to ensure that their assessments
were based on the value of oil and gas "in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the oil and
gas remaining in a relatively natural state," is error This Court should conclude, as it did in
Munson that "it is appropriate to overrule" the selective prospectivity limitation in the
ExxonMobil decision Munson, 2007 UT 91, % 21
2.

There are no "other relatively small governmental entities'5 which
would have been impacted by retroactive application of
ExxonMobil

The ExxonMobilCourt's application of the prospective effect doctrine was also based
on its concern for the solvency of "other relatively small government entities" which would,

3

The statute requinng deposits into the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund went into
effect July 1,1996 Utah Code Ann §§59-5-116
4

Evidence produced by the Division in another severance tax appeal further revealed
that the Court's concern for the impact on the Revitalization Funds was misplaced inasmuch
as the refunds to ExxonMobil were issued from the State's General Fund and the Navajo
Nation Revitalization Fund was not impacted Division's Supplemental Answers to
Petitioners7 First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests
for Admissions, River Gas Corp, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, Case No 060700437 (2nd Dist Ct.,
Dec 7, 2006), Admissions Nos 1, 2, 9-12, pp 8, 10 A copy of these Answers is attached in
the Addendum as pp 0053-0064
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presumably, be burdened by the ExxonMobil decision. This concern was misplaced because,
by law, all severance taxes, except for a portion of those collected for oil and gas production
on Indian lands, is remitted to the state's General Fund. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-115 The
"General Fund" is defined as "monies received into the treasury and not specially
appropriated to any other fund " Utah Code Ann § 67-4-2 (2007) Thus there were no
"other relatively small governmental entities" which would have been directly impacted by
the retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision.
The ExxonMobil Court did not have the benefit of a record on the prospective effect
limitation requested by the Amici Funds. Consequendy, the Court invoked the prospective
effect doctrine in a manner which has resulted in significant injustice for other severance
taxpayers, particularly those who, like Unocal, paid their severance taxes based on the correct
interpretation of the statute and have been assessed deficiencies
3.

The revenue concerns cited by the ExxonMobil Court are not
implicated by deficiency proceedings.

The Exxonmobil Court's determination that only prospective rekef would be granted
was based on its acceptance of the Commission's representations that broad-scale refunds
would jeopardize the solvency of the amici revitalization funds ExxonMobil^ 2003 UT 53 at
f 23.5 However, the Court's decision to foreclose taxpayers with deficiency assessments
from relying on ExxonMobil, results in an unfair windfall for the government and, when the
wells are on Indian trust lands, the revitalization funds. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co, v.
5

This representation appears to have been unfounded in kght of the fact that the
refund issued to ExxonMobil was issued directly from the State General Fund and there was
no effort by the State to obtain reimbursement from the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund.

23

Department of Avenue, 161 Ariz. 1355 138-39, 776 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1989) ("An honorable
government would not keep taxes to which it is not entitled.").
Deficiency assessments do not implicate the same considerations as refund requests
inasmuch as the revenue concerns cited by the ExxonMobil Court have no application when
the taxpayer is challenging a deficiency. If Unocal prevails in its appeals, government entities
would not be disgorging any revenue. However, the result of the Commission's
interpretation of ExxonMobil is that the government receives a $2.2 million windfall at
taxpayer expense.
By making the prospective effect doctrine applicable to deficiency assessments, the
Court ensures that taxpayers who, like Unocal, paid their severance taxes using the correct
interpretation of law, will be forced to pay millions of dollars in deficiency assessments. 6 The
Commission suggests that the Court intended this result in the name of equality, however,
the quest for "equality" is not a justifiable excuse for assessing deficiencies against taxpayers
who have paid their taxes in accordance with the correct interpretation of the applicable
statute. T h e facts of this case demonstrate that the ExxonMobil Court's decision to bar relief
in deficiency proceedings based on fiscal concerns implicated by refund actions for wells
located on Indian lands should not be given any precedential effect

6

In a recent Tax Court decision addressing the prospective application of the
ExxonMobil decision, the Court stated: "It is worth noting that upon questioning from the
Court neither attorney could cite to one tax case, other than ExxonMobil, that prospectively
applied its holding to deficiency proceedings." Ruling and Order on Plaintiffs Motion to
Compel, River Gas Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com/n'n, Case No. 060700437 (2nd Dist C t
O c t 19,2006). R. 1106.

24

